Mendenilla v. Onandia
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Emilio Mendenilla was appointed Chief of Police of the Municipality of Legaspi on June 21, 1954, holding a second-grade civil service eligibility and veteran status. His appointment was approved by the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission. On June 12, 1959, Republic Act No. 2234, the charter of Legaspi City, took effect, vesting the appointment of the Chief of Police in the President of the Philippines. Petitioner continued to hold the position. On February 5, 1960, the Acting City Treasurer suspended his salary payment pending a duly approved appointment. Petitioner applied for the position and later requested an acting appointment retroactive to June 12, 1959. On February 26, 1960, he was designated Acting Chief of Police, retroactive to June 12, 1959, and took his oath on March 11, 1960. Procedural History: On March 15, 1960, respondent Jose Manuel Onandia was nominated Chief of Police by the President. On March 18, 1960, petitioner's designation as Acting Chief of Police was terminated, and respondent was designated Acting Chief of Police. Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto on March 24, 1960. He turned over the office to the respondent on March 25, 1960, and collected his salary as Acting Chief of Police from June 12, 1959, to March 30, 1960. Respondent's nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 11, 1960, and he took his oath as regular Chief of Police on May 25, 1960. The Court of First Instance of Albay declared respondent the lawful holder of the office. The Petition: Petitioner Emilio Mendenilla appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance, asserting his right to the office of Chief of Police of Legaspi City.
Issue(s)
Whether the conversion of the Municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi by Republic Act No. 2234 abolished the existing municipal office of Chief of Police. Whether the abolition of the office of Chief of Police constitutes an illegal removal of the incumbent, petitioner Emilio Mendenilla, in violation of civil service laws and the Constitution. Whether petitioner Emilio Mendenilla is estopped from questioning the validity of respondent Jose Manuel Onandia's appointment as Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi. Whether the termination of petitioner Emilio Mendenilla's designation as Acting Chief of Police was lawful. Whether respondent Jose Manuel Onandia's appointment as Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi was valid, and if its validity can be assailed by petitioner Mendenilla. Whether respondent Jose Manuel Onandia's appointment violated Republic Act No. 1363, which gives preference to veterans in public service appointments.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, ruling in favor of the respondent. The Court held that the creation of Legaspi City abolished the municipal offices, including that of the Chief of Police, and that the petitioner's appointment ceased to have legal force. The designation of the petitioner as Acting Chief of Police was temporary and terminable at will, and the respondent's appointment was valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the conversion of the Municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi through Republic Act No. 2234 effectively abolished the existing municipal office of Chief of Police. The power to create or abolish municipal corporations and offices is a political function solely vested in the legislative branch, and municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, as reiterated in Unson v. Lacson, et al. With the creation of the City of Legaspi, the legal personality of the municipality was extinguished, leading to the dissolution of all municipal offices not explicitly saved by the new charter. Applying the principle of expressio unius, est exclusio alterius in statutory construction, only the offices specified in Section 96 of Article XVII of the charter were excepted from abolition. The Court distinguished the present case from Brillo v. Enage, noting that a Chief of Police is a municipal official paid by local funds and subject to changes in local government, unlike a Justice of the Peace who is a national official. Furthermore, the appointing power for the Chief of Police changed from the Municipal Mayor to the President, signifying the creation of a new, distinct office and validating its abolition. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that the abolition of the office of Chief of Police did not constitute an illegal removal of petitioner Emilio Mendenilla. It reiterated the fundamental rule in political law that no person has a vested right to an office, except for constitutional offices, as statutory offices are temporary and subject to legislative abolition, as discussed in Busacay v. Buenaventura. The Civil Service Law cannot override the legislature's power to alter, abolish, or create municipal offices, provided it is done in good faith and not to target a specific incumbent. Removal implies that the office continues to exist after the ouster, but when an office is validly abolished, there is no position from which one can be "removed." Citing Manalang v. Quitoriano, et al. and Dominguez, et al. v. Pascual, the Court affirmed that the abolition of an office, and not the incumbent, does not violate the constitutional prohibition against removal of a civil service officer except for cause. Thus, Republic Act No. 557, which governs removal or suspension of police members, was not transgressed by Republic Act No. 2234. On Issue 3: The Court found that petitioner Emilio Mendenilla was estopped from questioning the President's authority to appoint respondent Jose Manuel Onandia as Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi. Mendenilla himself, recognizing the change in the appointing authority, first applied to the President for the regular Chief of Police position. Subsequently, he requested and accepted the designation as Acting Chief of Police from the President, retroactive to the effectivity of the city charter, and collected salaries under this temporary appointment. By his own acts and conduct, he acknowledged the President's authority to appoint and designate the Chief of Police for the new city office. One who accepts an appointment to an office and receives its emoluments is estopped from denying the lawful creation of that office or the authority of the appointing power, especially when seeking relief in quo warranto. His actions demonstrated his acquiescence to the new legal framework. On Issue 4: The Supreme Court held that the termination of Mendenilla's designation as Acting Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi was lawful. A designation in an acting capacity is inherently temporary and terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Citing Austria v. Amante and Mendez v. Ganzon, the Court emphasized that an acting officer holds a temporary position until a permanent successor is appointed or qualified. Mendenilla accepted this acting designation with this understanding, and therefore cannot evade its legal consequences. Since acting appointments are temporary, they do not fall under the protective mantle of Republic Act No. 557, which applies only to permanent appointments of police members. Thus, the President acted within lawful authority when terminating Mendenilla's acting designation and designating Onandia in his stead, as such temporary positions offer no security of tenure. On Issue 5: The Court found no legal flaw in respondent Jose Manuel Onandia's nomination as Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi by the President and its subsequent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This appointment was made pursuant to Section 22, Article V of Republic Act No. 2234, which explicitly vests the appointing power for the Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi in the President. The office of Chief of Police of the City of Legaspi was legally a new and entirely different office from that of the abolished municipal position. When Mendenilla's temporary designation was terminated, the city's Chief of Police position became vacant, justifying the President's designation and subsequent nomination of Onandia. The change in the appointing power from the Municipal Mayor to the President was well within Congress's absolute power over municipal officers and their selection, thus validating Onandia's appointment. On Issue 6: The Court held that petitioner Mendenilla, not being lawfully entitled to the position of Chief of Police, could not raise any alleged flaw in his successor's appointment, including a supposed violation of Republic Act No. 1363 concerning veterans preference. Whatever flaw might exist in Onandia's appointment cannot be raised by Mendenilla since his own claim to the office had already been determined to be without merit. Moreover, it was observed that the President is, under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 2234, specifically empowered to appoint the Chief of Police for the City of Legaspi. Unlike the City Mayor, the law does not explicitly require the President to consider civil service and veteran qualifications of his appointees for this particular position. Therefore, the petitioner lacked the standing to successfully invoke this argument and challenge Onandia's valid appointment.
Main Doctrine
The conversion of a municipality into a city, through the enactment of a city charter, results in the abolition of municipal offices not expressly continued by the charter, and the incumbent's right to such office is terminated. An appointment in an acting capacity is temporary and terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority.