Hilario v. Bautista
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Plaintiff Alfredo Hilario constructed a dam illegally across a creek in Tarlac. Defendant Marciano D. Bautista, Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications, issued a decision on January 11, 1958, ordering Hilario to demolish the dam within thirty days of receipt, or face demolition at his expense, pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 2152. This decision stemmed from a water right concession application filed by defendant Cesar A. Manganaan. Hilario claimed he had no opportunity to present evidence and had acquired water rights by prescription, asserting that the dam was essential for irrigating numerous farmlands. He alleged that Bautista and other defendants threatened to demolish the dam, constituting an invasion of his rights. 2. Procedural History: Hilario initiated this case in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on October 8, 1958, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the demolition of his dam and a declaration of his rightful water use. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint, which the lower court granted. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Hilario appealed the dismissal order to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to the involvement of a single question of law. 3. The Petition: The appeal centers on whether Hilario's action in the Court of First Instance was filed within the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 4 of Act No. 2152 for appealing administrative decisions concerning water rights. Hilario argued that the thirty-day period should be counted from his notification of the denial of his motion for reconsideration (September 24, 1958), not from his receipt of the initial decision (March 6, 1958). The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the appeal period, suspended by the motion for reconsideration, resumed upon notice of denial and was thus exceeded by the filing of the complaint.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal from the administrative decision was filed within the thirty (30) day period prescribed by Section 4 of Act No. 2152, as amended. Whether the period of appeal should be computed from the receipt of the decision or from the notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The appeal was filed beyond the statutory period.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the appeal period: The Court clarified that the thirty (30) day period to appeal an administrative decision under Section 4 of Act No. 2152, as amended, is to be computed from the receipt of the decision itself. In this case, the plaintiff received the decision on March 6, 1958. The filing of a motion for reconsideration on March 28, 1958, which was twenty-two (22) days after receipt of the decision, suspended the running of the appeal period. However, the period resumed its course upon receipt of the notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1958. The Court explicitly stated that the period did not begin to run anew but continued from where it left off, citing previous rulings such as Centenera vs. Hon. Nicasio Yatco, et al. and Lloren vs. Hon. Jesus de Veyra. Therefore, the twenty-two (22) days that elapsed before the motion for reconsideration was filed must be added to the days that elapsed after the denial of the motion until the institution of the case. The case was filed thirty-six (36) days after notice of the decision, thus exceeding the thirty (30) day statutory period. On the computation of the appeal period: The plaintiff's contention that the period should be computed from the notice of denial of his motion for reconsideration was found to be fallacious. The law mandates that the appeal period commences from the notification of the parties of the decision. While a motion for reconsideration can suspend this period, it does not reset the commencement date. The period that had already elapsed prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration is crucial in determining the total time elapsed. The plaintiff's argument failed to account for the initial twenty-two (22) days that had passed before his motion was filed, leading to the conclusion that the appeal was indeed filed out of time.
Main Doctrine
The 30-day period to appeal an administrative decision under Section 4 of Act No. 2152, as amended, commences from the receipt of the decision. A motion for reconsideration suspends the running of this period, which resumes upon notice of denial and continues to run from where it left off.