Prepotente v. Surtida
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Dalmacio Prepotente filed a complaint against Primo Alcid and Vicente Manalo seeking recovery of P4,047.00, representing differential pay, overtime pay, separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees. Prepotente alleged he was hired as a driver by the respondents and was not paid the minimum wage or overtime compensation during his employment, and was subsequently dismissed without notice or just cause. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur initially dismissed Prepotente's complaint on October 19, 1959, ruling that the case fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. Prepotente received notice of this decision on October 23, 1960. He filed a motion for reconsideration on October 27, 1960, which was denied, and he received notice of the denial on February 15, 1961. Subsequently, on February 28, 1961, Prepotente filed a notice of appeal and a motion for an extension to file his record on appeal. He then filed his record on appeal and appeal bond on March 10, 1961. The lower court denied his appeal on March 24, 1961, for being filed out of time, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on April 17, 1961. 3. The Petition: Prepotente filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the orders of the Court of First Instance that denied his appeal and to compel the lower court to give due course to his appeal. He argued that his appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, considering the time his motion for reconsideration was pending. The petition contends that the lower court erred in denying the appeal, as the filing of the record on appeal and appeal bond on March 10, 1961, occurred within the extended period calculated by deducting the pendency of his motion for reconsideration, making the motion for extension itself moot.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period. Whether the lower court erred in denying due course to the appeal.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The orders of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dated March 24, 1961, and April 17, 1961, are set aside. The lower court is ordered to set the petitioner's record on appeal for hearing and, if found in order, to give due course to the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period: The perfection of an appeal requires the filing of a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal within 30 days from notice of the order or judgment, deducting the period during which a motion to set aside was pending. Petitioner received the decision on October 23, 1960. He filed a motion for reconsideration on October 27, 1960, and received the denial on February 15, 1961. Deducting the period his motion was pending, he had 26 days remaining, extending his deadline to March 13, 1962. He filed his notice of appeal on February 28, 1961, and his record on appeal and appeal bond on March 10, 1961, both well within the extended period. Therefore, his appeal was perfected on time. On Whether the lower court erred in denying due course to the appeal: The lower court's reason for denial was that the motion for extension was set for hearing after the reglementary period had expired. However, the motion for extension became unnecessary when the petitioner complied with all requirements for perfecting his appeal on March 10, 1961, before the statutory period expired. Since all legal requirements were met within the reglementary period, the lower court should have approved the record on appeal and given due course to the appeal, rather than denying it based on the timing of the motion for extension, which was rendered moot by timely compliance.
Main Doctrine
An appeal is deemed perfected on time if the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal are filed within the reglementary period, even if a motion for extension was filed and subsequently became unnecessary due to timely compliance.