Viacrucis v. Estenzo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Anastacio Orais and Celestina Malazarte (respondents) filed a complaint against Guillermo Viacrucis and Luisa de Viacrucis (petitioners) for recovery of possession of land, alleging acquisition by deed of sale. Petitioners received summons and complaint on December 15, 1960. Due to the failure to attach the deed of sale (Annex "A"), petitioners filed a motion for extension to answer until after receipt of the document. On December 28, 1960, the court granted an extension of 10 days from receipt of the document. Procedural History: Petitioners' former counsel received the order and the deed of sale on February 6, 1961. However, on January 31, 1961, the court issued an order declaring petitioners in default for failure to file an answer, and set the hearing for reception of evidence ex parte on February 13, 1961. Petitioners filed their answer on February 14, 1961, asserting the deed was a simulated sale. The court received evidence ex parte on February 15, 1961, and rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Petitioners received notice of the default order on February 16, 1961, and filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing their answer was filed within the extended period granted on December 28, 1960. The motion was denied on April 21, 1961, on the ground that service was deemed complete on January 29, 1961, making the default order on January 31, 1961, valid. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, alleging grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction by the respondent judge in declaring them in default prematurely.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioners in default. Whether the proceedings conducted ex parte and the subsequent decision are valid despite the alleged premature declaration of default.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the order of default, the ex parte decision, and the order denying the motion for reconsideration. The case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of premature declaration of default: The Court held that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioners in default on January 31, 1961. The order dated December 28, 1960, granted petitioners ten (10) days from receipt of the deed of sale to file their answer. Petitioners' counsel received the deed and the order on February 6, 1961. Therefore, their period to file an answer extended until February 16, 1961. The declaration of default on January 31, 1961, was eight days prior to the expiration of the granted period, making it premature and void. The Court clarified that even if service was deemed complete on January 29, 1961, as per the postmaster's notice, the ten-day period to answer would still expire on February 8, 1961, making the January 31, 1961, default order still premature. On the validity of ex parte proceedings and subsequent decision: The Court ruled that proceedings conducted ex parte and the decision rendered thereon, having been predicated on a void order of default, are also nullities. A void order cannot be revived or ratified by subsequent actions, such as the late filing of an answer. The Court distinguished this case from situations where a motion to set aside a default order is treated as a request for relief under Rule 38, which, upon denial, would be appealable. Here, the default order itself was assailed as inherently defective due to prematurity. The Court reiterated that a premature declaration of default deprives a defendant of their day in court, rendering any subsequent judgment void and reviewable by certiorari, citing Luz v. Court of First Instance of Tacloban and other similar cases.
Main Doctrine
A declaration of default made before the expiration of the defendant's period to file an answer is premature and void. Proceedings had pursuant to a void order of default are likewise nullities and may be corrected by a writ of certiorari.