Blas v. Santos
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners filed a motion for execution of a Supreme Court decision (G.R. No. L-14070) in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. The CFI granted the motion and issued a writ of execution. Procedural History: Respondent executrix Rosalina Santos filed a motion to set the case for hearing to determine factual issues regarding the properties to be conveyed, to whom, and in what proportions. Petitioners opposed this, arguing the Supreme Court's decision was clear. Simultaneously, intervenors Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño sought to intervene, claiming to be legatees entitled to a share. Petitioners opposed their intervention, citing res judicata and the law of the case doctrine. The Petition: The CFI, in an order dated October 25, 1961, admitted the complaint in intervention, granted the motion for hearing, and denied the motion to enforce the judgment. Petitioners sought certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition against this order, arguing the CFI judge gravely abused her discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering a hearing to determine factual issues before executing the Supreme Court's judgment. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in admitting the complaint in intervention of Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is set aside, and the court is ordered to proceed with the execution of the judgment in G.R. No. L-14070 in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision. The intervention of Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño is disallowed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of executing the judgment: The Supreme Court held that the execution of its previous decision (G.R. No. L-14070) did not require a further hearing to segregate specific properties. The Court clarified that its intention was for the executing court to determine the undivided portion or aliquot part of all properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos that should be conveyed. This aliquot part should then be conveyed through an appropriate deed and delivered to the petitioners, without the necessity of physically partitioning the bulk of the properties. The Court emphasized that the project of partition did not segregate Maxima Santos' conjugal share from her inherited or purchased properties, making specific segregation impractical and unnecessary for fulfilling the judgment. The practice in estate distribution allows for assignment of residue by aliquot part, as provided in Rule 91, Section 1. The original action was based on a promise to convey one-half of Maxima Santos' share in the conjugal properties, not a demand for specific segregation. Therefore, the respondent judge's order for a hearing to resolve these factual issues was an abuse of discretion, as the Supreme Court's decision was clear on the method of execution. On the issue of intervention: The Supreme Court ruled that the intervenors, Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño, were not embraced within the term "herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan" (heirs and legatees or beneficiaries) of the deceased Simeon Blas, as used in the document Annex "H" (the promise made by Maxima Santos). The Court meticulously examined Simeon Blas's will and Maxima Santos's promise, noting that the term "ipinamamana" in the will referred to legal heirs or relatives, while "ipinagkakaloob" referred to non-relatives who received legacies. Since Pinpin and Avendaño received legacies under the term "ipinagkakaloob," they were not the intended beneficiaries of Maxima Santos's promise to convey one-half of her conjugal share to the "herederos at legatarios" of her husband. The Court reasoned that given the contemporaneous preparation of the will and the promise by the same individuals, the terms used were intended to have distinct meanings. Therefore, the intervenors had no right to claim under Annex "H," and their intervention should have been disallowed.
Main Doctrine
The execution of a judgment ordering the conveyance of a share in properties, particularly when the share is an aliquot part of the whole, should be done by determining the undivided portion or aliquot part to be conveyed and then executing a deed for that portion, rather than requiring a physical segregation of specific properties, unless the judgment explicitly demands it.