Calo v. Aragon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On November 20, 1961, respondent Adolfo B. Benavides, as assignee of Ajax International Corporation, filed a complaint against petitioners Consuelo V. Calo and Marcos M. Calo for the recovery of P3,620.65 plus interest and attorney's fees for unpaid merchandise. Procedural History: On December 4, 1961, petitioners were served with a copy of the complaint and summons. They failed to answer or appear at the hearing. Consequently, on December 13, 1961, the Municipal Court rendered a default judgment against them. Petitioners received a copy of this decision on January 2, 1962. On January 5, 1962, they filed a petition for relief and to set aside the decision, alleging lack of valid service of summons, lack of jurisdiction over their persons as residents of Butuan City, and a valid defense based on incomplete delivery of goods and damages. Meanwhile, on December 26, 1961, the court issued a writ of execution. On January 10, 1962, petitioners filed an urgent ex parte motion to set aside the execution order, arguing the decision was not yet final due to the pending petition for relief. On January 11, 1962, the sheriff seized petitioners' car pursuant to the writ of execution and scheduled its sale. The Petition: On January 12, 1962, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the decision and the sale of their car. A preliminary injunction was issued.
Issue(s)
Whether the Municipal Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by ignoring the petitioners' timely petition for relief and proceeding with the execution of the default judgment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the writs prayed for and ordered the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. The decision and the order of execution were revoked.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the trial court's actuation constituted a clear abuse of discretion and a denial of due process. The Court noted that the petitioners seasonably filed their petition for relief on January 5, 1962, just three days after receiving the decision. By failing to act on this petition and instead allowing the Sheriff to proceed with the seizure of property, the trial court effectively denied the petitioners their right to be heard. Following the doctrine in Martinez, et al. v. Villacete, the Court emphasized that the opportunity to be heard is essential to due process of law. The Court found that because the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary period, the judgment was not yet final and executory in a manner that would permit the ignore-and-execute approach taken by the lower court. Consequently, the petitioners were entitled to the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct the jurisdictional error. The case was remanded to ensure the petitioners could present their defenses and challenge the validity of the service of summons.
Main Doctrine
A trial court's actuation in ignoring a timely filed petition for relief and a motion to set aside an order of execution, proceeding instead to seize property, constitutes an abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, thereby depriving the party of their day in court and violating due process.