Cabarroguis v. San Diego
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Caridad Cabarroguis was accused of estafa in Criminal Case No. 5355-P. During the hearing on February 28, 1962, the prosecution's sole witness, Emerita C. Orpilla, testified that she agreed to lend P7,800.00 to the accused, who promised to repay in goods. The accused informed the complainant that she needed cash to pay customs duties for goods pending at the pier. Procedural History: At the conclusion of the complainant's testimony, the respondent Judge dictated a verbal order in open court dismissing the case, stating that the transaction appeared to be a loan and not estafa. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, presenting a document to show the accused did not have the goods, indicating an intent to defraud. The respondent Judge then set aside her verbal order of dismissal and allowed the prosecution to continue presenting evidence. Petitioner moved to set aside the order withdrawing the dismissal, alleging double jeopardy. This motion was denied, leading to the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Petition: Petitioner sought to set aside the order withdrawing the verbal order of dismissal, arguing that the initial verbal order, even if not written, amounted to an acquittal, and its withdrawal placed her in double jeopardy, citing Catilo vs. Abaya and Esguerra vs. De la Costa.
Issue(s)
Whether the verbal order of dismissal, not reduced to writing and signed by the judge, amounts to an acquittal. Whether the withdrawal of the verbal order of dismissal and the subsequent continuation of the trial placed the petitioner in double jeopardy. Whether the petitioner waived her right against double jeopardy by failing to object to the continuation of the proceedings.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The verbal order of dismissal was not a final judgment and its withdrawal did not violate the petitioner's right against double jeopardy. The petitioner waived her right by failing to object to the continuation of the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the verbal order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal: The Court held that a verbal order of dismissal, which was not reduced to writing and signed by the judge, is incomplete and does not have the effect of acquitting the accused. Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, a judgment must be written, personally prepared by the judge, and signed by him. Since the verbal order in this case was never put in writing nor signed, it did not constitute a final judgment that would bar further proceedings. The cases cited by the petitioner involved written orders of dismissal, which are distinguishable from the present situation. On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court ruled that the withdrawal of an incomplete verbal order of dismissal does not place the accused in double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches when a person is charged with a crime, tried by a competent court, and acquitted or convicted. In this case, since there was no valid acquittal due to the incomplete nature of the dismissal order, the subsequent continuation of the trial did not violate the petitioner's constitutional right against double jeopardy. The prosecution was allowed to continue presenting its evidence after the verbal order was set aside. On the issue of waiver of the right against double jeopardy: The Court found that the petitioner waived her right against double jeopardy. She did not object to the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the verbal order of dismissal, nor to the respondent Judge's order withdrawing the dismissal. Furthermore, she did not object to the continuation of the complainant's examination by the prosecution and her counsel even cross-examined the witness. This failure to object at the opportune time, when the proceedings continued, amounted to a waiver of her constitutional right. The objection was raised only about a week later, which the Court deemed too late.
Main Doctrine
A verbal order of dismissal, not reduced to writing and signed by the judge, is incomplete and does not have the effect of acquitting the accused, thus its withdrawal does not place the accused in double jeopardy. Furthermore, failure to object to the continuation of the proceedings after such withdrawal constitutes a waiver of the right against double jeopardy.