Maco Stevedoring Corporation v. Abbas
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case concerns a claim for compensation by Nenita S. Ursal following the death of Sergio S. Ursal, who allegedly died in the course of his employment with Maco Stevedoring Corporation. The Regional Office No. 8 of the Department of Labor issued an award on September 13, 1960, ordering Maco Stevedoring Corporation to pay Ursal P2,808.00 in compensation and P29.00 to the Regional Office as a fee. 2. Procedural History: On February 26, 1962, Nenita S. Ursal filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Davao, presided over by Judge Macapanton Abbas, seeking the issuance of a writ of execution for the aforementioned award, pursuant to Section 52 of Act No. 3428, as amended. Maco Stevedoring Corporation objected, asserting that the award had been withdrawn due to the dismissal of the case by the Hearing Officer on November 10, 1960. Despite this objection, the respondent judge granted the petition for execution. 3. The Petition: Maco Stevedoring Corporation filed an original petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the order of execution issued by the respondent judge. The petitioner argues that the respondent judge erred in issuing the writ of execution, contending that the underlying award had been effectively withdrawn. The Supreme Court, however, found the petition to be without merit, reasoning that the dismissal order of November 10, 1960, pertained only to a petition for relief from the award, not the award itself, which had been entered prior to that dismissal.
Issue(s)
Whether the order of dismissal dated November 10, 1960, had the effect of withdrawing or annulling the award of compensation dated September 13, 1960. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution.
Ruling
The petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed. The order of dismissal dated November 10, 1960, did not annul the award of compensation dated September 13, 1960. The respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the effect of the dismissal order: The Supreme Court held that the order of dismissal dated November 10, 1960, could not have referred to the dismissal of the claim of respondent Ursal where an order of award had already been entered. The order explicitly stated that the Hearing Officer issued it "Before this case is heard for the relief from an order of award, Ruperto C. Garcia, President of the respondent corporation in the above-entitled case, filed a petition to withdraw its previous petition on grounds stated in the petition to withdraw." This clearly indicates that the dismissal pertained to the petition for relief from the award, not the award itself. The Court reasoned that the phrase "this case is hereby ordered dismissed" could only refer to the dismissal or withdrawal of the petition for relief, as there was no other cause of action pending that could be dismissed. The original award of compensation remained valid and enforceable. On the issuance of the writ of execution: Given that the award of compensation remained valid and enforceable, the Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge in issuing the writ of execution. The petition for execution was filed pursuant to Section 52 of Act No. 3428, as amended, which allows for the execution of awards made by the Regional Labor Office. The Court concluded that the petitioner's objection was based on a misinterpretation of the dismissal order, and therefore, the execution of the valid award was proper.
Main Doctrine
An order of dismissal of a case, based on a petition to withdraw a previous petition for relief from an award, cannot be construed as a dismissal of the original claim for compensation where an award had already been entered.