In re Gutierrez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez was convicted of murder for the killing of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan. He was sentenced to death, which was later modified to reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court. Respondent served a portion of his sentence before being granted a conditional pardon by the President, which remitted the unexecuted portion of his sentence on the condition that he would not violate any penal laws. Procedural History: The widow of the deceased filed a verified complaint with the Supreme Court seeking the disbarment of respondent pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5. Respondent admitted the facts but invoked the conditional pardon as a defense, citing the case of In re Lontok. The Petition: The complainant prayed for the removal of respondent from the roll of lawyers.
Issue(s)
Whether a conditional pardon bars disbarment proceedings against a lawyer convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Whether the conviction for murder, a crime involving moral turpitude, warrants the disbarment of the respondent lawyer.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ordered the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez and directed that his name be stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether a conditional pardon bars disbarment proceedings against a lawyer convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude: The Court distinguished the present case from the ruling in In re Lontok. In Lontok, the pardon was assumed to be absolute, operating to "wipe out the conviction" and serve as a bar to disbarment proceedings. However, the pardon granted to respondent Gutierrez was conditional, merely remitting the unexecuted portion of his sentence. This conditional pardon did not reach the offense itself, unlike an absolute pardon which "blots out the existence of guilt." Therefore, the ratio decidendi in Lontok was deemed inapplicable. The Court held that respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder, irrespective of the conditional pardon invoked as a defense. The nature of the crime, involving moral turpitude, remains a valid basis for disbarment proceedings. On whether the conviction for murder, a crime involving moral turpitude, warrants the disbarment of the respondent lawyer: The Court affirmed that murder is unequivocally a crime involving moral turpitude, encompassing acts contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, and an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in social duties. The practice of law is a privilege requiring adherence to high standards of mental and moral fitness, which are not lowered after admission to the bar. Lawyers are sworn to uphold the law, and their violation thereof, especially through conviction of a heinous crime like murder, demonstrates recreancy to their office and sets a pernicious example. The degree of moral turpitude involved in the murder conviction was found to be sufficient justification for purging the respondent from the legal profession.
Main Doctrine
A conditional pardon that merely remits the unexecuted portion of a sentence does not erase the conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, and thus does not bar disbarment proceedings against a lawyer.