Ong See Hang v. Commissioner of Immigration
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners, Chinese nationals who originated from Amoy, China, and were residing in Hongkong, arrived in the Philippines on November 3, 1952, aboard the S.S. Cleveland. They were granted temporary disembarkation privileges to transit to Hongkong, with a deadline of November 28, 1952. However, they failed to depart within the stipulated period. Subsequently, warrants for their arrest were issued. Despite initial assurances of departure to Formosa, no action was taken by the Chinese Nationalist government. The petitioners include four women who gave birth in the Philippines, resulting in children who are now separated from their mothers and under the care of friends. Their reentry visas to Hongkong expired in April 1953, and subsequent applications for new visas were pending. Procedural History: On April 20, 1953, warrants for the arrest of the petitioners were issued by the Immigration authorities due to their failure to leave the Philippines as per the conditions of their temporary stay. Following an investigation and allowing them to post bail, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration found that the petitioners had violated the terms of their temporary stay, rendering them subject to deportation under Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Consequently, orders of deportation were issued, and warrants of deportation were subsequently executed, leading to the petitioners' confinement at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station. A request for their release on bail pending deportation was denied by the First Deputy Commissioner of Immigration. The petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Manila, which, while denying the writ, allowed their provisional release on bail pending deportation. The Petition: The respondents, the Commissioner of Immigration and the Immigration Detention Officer, appealed the trial court's decision to the extent that it ordered the release of the petitioners on bail pending their deportation. The core of the appeal is that the trial court erred in granting bail to aliens under detention for deportation. The respondents argue that aliens in deportation proceedings do not possess an inherent right to bail, as this is a discretionary power vested solely in the Commissioner of Immigration under Section 37(9)(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. They contend that the constitutional right to bail is not applicable to deportation proceedings, as these are not criminal actions. Furthermore, they assert that the petitioners' continued illegal stay is a result of circumstances of their own making, and not due to any fault or impossibility of deportation by the government, distinguishing their case from prior rulings where stateless aliens were granted release due to indefinite detention.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in granting bail to aliens under detention pending deportation. Whether the constitutional right to bail applies to deportation proceedings. Whether the Commissioner of Immigration has the exclusive discretion to grant bail in deportation proceedings.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court insofar as it ordered the petitioners' release on bail pending their actual deportation. The Court affirmed the denial of the petition for habeas corpus.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting bail to aliens under detention pending deportation: The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in ordering the petitioners' release on bail. The Court reiterated that aliens in deportation proceedings, as a rule, have no inherent right to bail. The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, specifically Section 37 (9) (e), confers upon the Commissioner of Immigration the power and discretion to grant bail, but this power is permissive and not mandatory. The determination of whether to allow temporary release on bail falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner, not the courts. The Court emphasized that the writ of habeas corpus did not place the petitioners in the custody of the court, nor could it enlarge their rights if they were not already entitled to bail. The denial of the habeas corpus petition by the lower court further solidified the position that bail should not have been granted. On the applicability of the constitutional right to bail to deportation proceedings: The Supreme Court clarified that the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked in deportation proceedings. This is because deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action, and an order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime. Instead, it is a measure for the return to their country of aliens who have violated the conditions of their residence. The Court cited previous rulings that deportation is not a penal offense and the order is not a sentence. Therefore, the constitutional guarantee of bail, which applies to criminal actions, is not applicable here. On whether the Commissioner of Immigration has the exclusive discretion to grant bail in deportation proceedings: The Supreme Court affirmed that the Commissioner of Immigration possesses the exclusive and full discretion to determine whether an alien subject to deportation should be granted bail. The provision in the Immigration Act using the word "may" signifies that the grant of bail is discretionary. This power is vested in the Commissioner, and courts do not administer immigration laws. The Court referenced its own ruling in Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration where it held that the Commissioner has jurisdiction over petitions for bail in deportation cases. Furthermore, the Court noted that even if bail were to be considered, the power to grant it appears to be exercisable by the Commissioner while the alien is still under investigation, as there is no express legal provision authorizing such release after an order of deportation has been issued by the Board of Immigration. The Court also distinguished the present case from others where indefinite detention was deemed an unwarranted deprivation of liberty, noting that the petitioners were not stateless and had options for deportation, with any delays attributable to circumstances of their own making rather than government fault.
Main Doctrine
The Commissioner of Immigration has the sole discretion to grant bail to aliens subject to deportation proceedings, and courts cannot compel such release absent express legal provision or grave abuse of discretion by the Commissioner.