Casilan v. Ybañez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Alipio N. Casilan obtained a favorable judgment for P15,000.00 against Hipolita Chapman in Civil Case No. Q-1941 before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. A writ of execution was issued, and the Provincial Sheriff of Leyte levied upon properties of Chapman, including two parcels of land, a residential house, and machinery, which were advertised for sale. The levy on the realty was entered in the Daybook of the Register of Deeds, but not on the transfer certificate of title in Hipolita Chapman's name. Procedural History: Before the sheriff's sale, Antonio Montilla, claiming to be a prior judgment creditor of Chapman, and Paz B. Tiongzon, alleging to be a mortgagee of the levied lands, filed separate injunction cases (Civil Cases Nos. 2985 and 2990) in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. They claimed to be preferred creditors. The Leyte court issued preliminary injunctions restraining the sale. After trial, the Leyte court rendered judgment on March 21, 1962, declaring the claims of Montilla and Tiongzon as having priority over Casilan's levy and making the injunctions permanent. The Petition: Casilan, after moving for reconsideration which was denied, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the injunctions issued by the Leyte court as an unlawful interference with the judgment of a coordinate court (Quezon City).
Issue(s)
Whether the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Leyte constituted an unlawful interference with the judgment of a coordinate court. Whether the Supreme Court could set aside the permanent injunction through a writ of certiorari.
Ruling
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. The Supreme Court held that it could no longer interfere with the preliminary injunctions as they were superseded by the permanent injunction issued in the judgment on the merits. Regarding the permanent injunction, the Court stated that no action could be taken without reviewing the judgment on the merits, which was not the proper remedy via certiorari. The Court emphasized that the Leyte court had the power to determine the question of preference of credits, and any error in its findings would constitute an error of law, not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. The proper remedy for Casilan was a timely appeal from the judgment on the merits, which he failed to pursue, rendering the judgment final and unappealable.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of unlawful interference and the propriety of certiorari: The Supreme Court held that the petition for certiorari was without merit. The preliminary injunctions, having been superseded by the permanent injunction in the judgment on the merits, could no longer be the subject of interference by the Supreme Court through certiorari. Furthermore, the permanent injunction was a consequence of the judgment on the merits, which determined the priority of credits. The Court emphasized that the Leyte court possessed the jurisdiction and authority to adjudicate such a question of preference. Therefore, any alleged error in the findings of the Leyte court would be considered an error of law, not a grave abuse of discretion, which is the proper ground for a writ of certiorari. The remedy for errors of law is an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. On the finality of the judgment: The Supreme Court underscored that the judgment on the merits, which made the injunction permanent, had become final and unappealable. Casilan's motion for reconsideration was filed sixteen days after notice of the judgment, and his counsel received notice of denial thirty-five days before applying for certiorari. The Court reiterated that a final and unappealable judgment cannot be set aside through proceedings for a writ of certiorari. The proper procedural recourse for Casilan, given the amount involved, would have been to file a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals. His failure to do so extinguished his right to question the judgment on its merits through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
Main Doctrine
A writ of certiorari cannot be used to set aside a judgment that has become final and unappealable, especially when the alleged error constitutes an error of law, not an abuse of discretion, and the proper remedy would have been a timely appeal.