People v. Coquia
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On July 1, 1957, David C. Naval filed a complaint for grave oral defamation against Dolores Coquia with the Municipal Court of Naga City. The Municipal Court ordered Coquia's arrest. On July 22, 1957, the Municipal Court forwarded the records to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur, as the accused waived her right to the second stage of preliminary investigation. The CFI endorsed the case to the City Attorney's office for reinformation. The City Fiscal's office took no action until January 26, 1959, when an information for grave oral defamation was filed with the CFI. Procedural History: The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription, which the prosecution opposed. The trial court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The City Attorney, through the Solicitor General's Office, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Petition: The Solicitor General conceded the undue delay in filing the information and the probable prescription of the offense. However, the appeal was interposed to secure a ruling on when a criminal proceeding is considered "unjustifiably stopped" to mark the resumption of the running of the period of prescription under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Court and its subsequent transmittal to the Court of First Instance, followed by endorsement to the City Attorney's office, interrupts the prescriptive period for grave oral defamation. Whether the prescriptive period for grave oral defamation had set in before the filing of the information in the Court of First Instance.
Ruling
The appeal is dismissed, and the order dismissing the information is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of interruption of the prescriptive period: The Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Juan del Rosario (G.R. No. L-15140, December 29, 1960) that the filing of a complaint or information which interrupts the running of the prescriptive period must be that which is filed in the proper court. The Court clarified that the "denuncia" or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office, or the transmittal of records to the CFI and endorsement to the City Attorney's office, does not constitute the filing of a complaint or information in the proper court for the purpose of interrupting prescription. The proper court in this case was the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The records showed that no formal complaint or information, as contemplated by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, was ever filed therein within the reglementary period. On the issue of prescription: The prescriptive period for grave oral defamation is six months, as provided by Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense occurred on July 1, 1957. The information was filed on January 26, 1959, which is more than one year after the commission of the offense. Since the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court and the subsequent procedural steps did not interrupt the prescriptive period, and the formal information was filed only after the lapse of the six-month period, the offense had clearly prescribed. Therefore, the conclusion deducible is that the crime had prescribed, and the dismissal of the case by the trial court was proper.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a complaint or information in the Fiscal's Office does not interrupt the prescriptive period for offenses; only the filing of a complaint or information in the proper court does.