Dalamal v. Deportation Board
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged with violating Central Bank Rules and Regulations. The complaint was filed with the Deportation Board by a Special Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. 2. Procedural History: Acting on the complaint, the Chairman of the Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for Dalamal. Dalamal was arrested but later released on a P10,000.00 bond. The case reached the Supreme Court via a petition for habeas corpus. 3. The Petition: Dalamal sought the annulment of the warrant of arrest and cancellation of his bond, arguing that the warrant issued by the Deportation Board was illegal. He contended that Section 1-(b) of Executive Order No. 398, which authorized the Deportation Board to issue warrants, was unconstitutional as it violated Article III, Section 1-(3) of the Constitution, which vests the power to issue warrants solely in judges upon probable cause. He also argued that the delegation of such power to the Deportation Board was unlawful, violating the principle against sub-delegation of powers.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 1-(b) of Executive Order No. 398, authorizing the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest against aliens, is null and void. Whether the President's power to order the arrest of an alien, either as an incident of his inherent power to deport or through legislative delegation, can be further delegated to the Deportation Board.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The warrant of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is set aside, and the bond posted by the petitioner is cancelled.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court found that Section 69 of the Administrative Code of 1917, which governs deportation proceedings, merely prescribes the procedure for investigation and does not authorize the President, directly or indirectly, to issue a warrant of arrest against an alien. Executive Order No. 398, in authorizing the Deportation Board to issue such warrants, transcends the authority granted to the President by Section 69. While the Court noted a divergence of opinion among its members regarding whether Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution (which requires warrants to be issued by a judge upon probable cause) applies to administrative or only criminal proceedings, it deemed it unnecessary to elaborate on this point for the decision. The critical finding was the lack of statutory basis for the Deportation Board's power to issue warrants. On Issue 2: The Court held that even assuming the President has an inherent power to order the arrest of an alien or that such power is delegated by the Legislature through Section 69, that specific power cannot be further delegated to the Deportation Board. This is based on the principle of delegata potestas non potest delegare. The power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion and judgment to determine if the curtailment of liberty is warranted, as affirmed in Qua Chee Gan, et al. v. The Deportation Board. Official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment are personal and cannot be delegated, unlike ministerial duties. To allow delegation of such a nebulous, implied power would be inimical to the liberties of the people and contrary to constitutional guarantees. Therefore, Executive Order No. 398, insofar as it authorizes the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest, is null and void because such power cannot be delegated, nor is it authorized by Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Main Doctrine
The power of the President to order the arrest of an alien as an incident of his power of investigation with a view to deportation cannot be delegated to the Deportation Board, as it involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, and such delegation is unlawful under the principle of delegata potestas non potest delegare.