Acenas v. Sison
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Angela Sison executed a promissory note for P8,160 payable to Emma S. Acenas in installments. Failure to pay two consecutive installments would make the balance due. Mrs. Sison paid up to August 31, 1957, leaving a balance. She was sued, and her husband, Teofilo Sison, was joined as a defendant pursuant to Article 113 of the Civil Code. Mr. Sison denied liability, stating he had not signed the note. Procedural History: On the scheduled hearing date, the defendants' counsel moved for postponement to confer with his clients for settlement. The plaintiffs' counsel objected. The court suggested a judgment on the pleadings or confession of judgment. The defendants' counsel agreed to a confession of judgment, provided no writ of execution would be issued until June 30, 1960. The court granted this, rendering judgment jointly and severally against both defendants for the principal amount, interest, and attorney's fees, subject to the execution delay. The Petition: Defendants appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Appellant Teofilo Sison contended that his lawyer agreed to a judgment on the pleadings, not a confession of judgment, and that he never authorized such confession. He also argued he was not liable on his wife's note.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in accepting a confession of judgment made by counsel without ascertaining his authority, particularly concerning the husband. Whether the husband is solidarily liable with the wife by virtue of his joinder in the action pursuant to Article 113 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the decision of the lower court. It held that Teofilo Sison is not liable, while Angela Sison alone is liable to the plaintiffs for the adjudged amount. No costs were awarded.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the husband's liability due to confession of judgment: The Court held that it was error for the trial court to accept the confession of judgment made by counsel without ascertaining his authority, at least with respect to Teofilo Sison. The records did not show that Atty. Sison had authority to confess judgment; in fact, his motion for postponement to confer with his clients indicated a lack of such authority. The Court cited Natividad v. Natividad and Anduiza v. Quirona, stating that a confession of judgment, like a compromise, requires special authority from the client and cannot be done by counsel alone. The Court distinguished the present case from Georgia cases, noting that Philippine law, specifically Section 21 of Rule 127, expressly requires special authority for attorneys to compromise litigation or permit judgment to be entered against their clients. The confession of judgment was maintained with respect to Angela Sison, as her liability was admitted and no claim was made that the confession was unauthorized on her behalf. On the issue of the husband's solidary liability by joinder: The Court disagreed with the appellees' contention that the joinder of the husband under Article 113 of the Civil Code automatically makes him solidarily liable. The Court explained that the law requires the husband's joinder not to bind him with his wife, but because he is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, which might be held liable. To make the husband solidarily liable simply because of his joinder would subvert the basic rule that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in specific instances (husband's consent, wife's spending for daily family needs, or wife's management of the partnership), none of which were alleged in the complaint. Therefore, Teofilo Sison was not solidarily liable.
Main Doctrine
A confession of judgment made by counsel without special authority from the client, particularly the husband in an action involving the wife's obligation, may be set aside as to the client who did not authorize it, as the joinder of the husband in such actions does not automatically make him solidarily liable.