Savellano v. Diaz
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Martin Savellano alleged that on December 28, 1954, defendant Pelagia M. Diaz executed a public instrument conveying to him the exclusive enjoyment of two hectares of land, including hemp stalks, for P600, until the amount was returned. Savellano took possession and spent for the land's preservation. In November or December 1956, and repeatedly in February and March 1957, defendants Pelagia M. Diaz and Pablo Diaz, with laborers, forcibly entered the land, took hemp valued at P100, and caused Savellano expenses and damages. Savellano prayed for injunction, restoration of possession, and damages. Procedural History: The Justice of the Peace Court of Tagum, Davao, rendered a judgment. The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao, which reproduced the pleadings. After trial, the CFI rendered judgment on August 4, 1960, ordering Savellano's restoration to possession and awarding him P90.00 for actual damages representing the value of products taken. Defendants' motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming the CFI erred in not dismissing the case under Section 11, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, and in deciding on unproven allegations.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in trying the case on the merits instead of dismissing it on appeal. Whether the plaintiff was in actual and physical possession of the land at the time of dispossession. Whether the defendants committed forcible entry.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, ordering the plaintiff's restoration to possession and payment of actual damages, with costs against the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Court of First Instance trying the case on the merits: The Court invoked Section 11 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which allows a Court of First Instance to try a case on the merits if parties file pleadings and go to trial without objection to jurisdiction, even if the inferior court lacked jurisdiction. The defendants' participation in the proceedings before the CFI, including filing an answer and proceeding to trial, constituted a waiver of any objection to the court's jurisdiction. Their argument that the CFI should have converted the action into one for accounting was rejected as the parties proceeded to trial on the merits of the forcible entry case. On the issue of actual and physical possession: The Court found that the plaintiff, Martin Savellano, was indeed in actual and physical possession of the parcel of land. This was supported by the agreement (Exhibit A) executed on December 28, 1954, between Savellano and Pelagia M. Diaz. The agreement explicitly stated that the property was "given in possession and usufruct" to Savellano. Furthermore, the defendants' own answer admitted that they had served notice of their intention to "withdraw the possession" of the property, implicitly acknowledging Savellano's prior possession. On the issue of forcible entry: The Court held that the defendants committed forcible entry by using force to recover possession of the property from the legal possessor, Savellano. Article 536 of the Civil Code clearly states that possession cannot be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is an objecting possessor. The law requires invoking the aid of the competent court if the holder refuses to deliver the thing. The defendants' act of forcibly entering the land and taking hemp, despite Savellano's possession, violated this provision. Therefore, forcible entry was the appropriate remedy for Savellano.
Main Doctrine
A party who has been unlawfully deprived of actual and physical possession of a property, even if the deprivation is based on a belief of extinguished debt, may avail of the remedy of forcible entry. The use of force to recover possession from a legal possessor violates Article 536 of the Civil Code, which mandates invoking the aid of the competent court.