Philippine National Bank v. Dionisio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On December 21, 1949, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in Civil Case No. 9694 in favor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) against Galicano Ador Dionisio and Asuncion R. Dionisio for various sums of money representing loans. Procedural History: PNB filed a complaint for revival of judgment on October 8, 1960, after the five-year period for enforcement by motion had elapsed. The defendants filed a Petition to Dismiss, arguing that the action had prescribed. PNB opposed, asserting that the prescriptive period was interrupted by two extrajudicial written demands made on March 29, 1954, and September 5, 1954. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that the action had prescribed and that extrajudicial demands do not interrupt the prescription for reviving a judgment. The trial court denied PNB's motion for reconsideration. The Petition: PNB appealed the dismissal orders, arguing that the extrajudicial demands interrupted the prescriptive period.
Issue(s)
Whether the extrajudicial written demands made by the plaintiff-appellant interrupted the prescriptive period for filing an action to revive the judgment. Whether the action for revival of judgment had already prescribed.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the Orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila, holding that the action for revival of judgment had prescribed. The Court ruled that extrajudicial written demands do not suspend the prescriptive period for an action to revive a judgment under Act No. 190.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether extrajudicial written demands interrupt the prescriptive period for reviving a judgment: The Court held that Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, which provides that prescription is interrupted by a written extrajudicial demand, is not applicable to the instant case. The judgment became final on December 21, 1949. The New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950. Article 1116 of the New Civil Code states that prescription already running before its effectivity shall be governed by prior laws. Therefore, Act No. 190 is the applicable law. Section 50 of Act No. 190 enumerates the grounds for renewing a right of action, which include payment, written acknowledgment, or a written promise to pay. It does not include written extrajudicial demands made by the creditor. The Court reasoned that the extrajudicial demands made by the plaintiff did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period under Act No. 190. The Court further noted that the trial court correctly reasoned that if extrajudicial demands could interrupt the prescriptive period for reviving a judgment, such judgments would never terminate, which was not contemplated by the law. Moreover, judgments are ordinarily enforced by a writ of execution, not by extrajudicial demand. On the issue of whether the action for revival of judgment had already prescribed: Since the extrajudicial demands did not interrupt the prescriptive period under the applicable law (Act No. 190), and more than ten years and nine months had elapsed from the time the judgment became final until the complaint for revival was filed, the action had indeed prescribed. The Court found no error in the trial court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Main Doctrine
Extrajudicial written demands made by a creditor do not suspend the prescriptive period for an action to revive a judgment under Act No. 190, as such demands are only contemplated for actions that have not yet been reduced to a final judgment.