Damasco v. Arrieta
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondents Teodorico G. Avisado, Lumances C. Libertad, and Leonardo C. Artianza, claiming they were illegally refused payment of their salaries, filed a case against petitioner Lope Damasco, in his capacity as Provincial Governor of Bukidnon and as a private citizen, seeking reinstatement to their positions and payment of salaries. 2. Procedural History: The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon (Special Civil Case No. 182). The trial court rendered a decision against Governor Damasco on December 2, 1960. The provincial fiscal, who was representing Governor Damasco, received a copy of the decision on December 12, 1960. The fiscal did not appeal, but Governor Damasco's private counsel in Manila received a copy on December 15, 1960, and filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond on January 3, 1961. The petitioners (now respondents) moved for execution, arguing the decision was final. The trial court granted this motion. Governor Damasco then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling that the decision was final and executory. This led to the present appeal. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Damasco seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that his appeal filed by private counsel should have been given due course as it was filed within the reglementary period. The core issue is whether the reglementary period to appeal began to run from the date the provincial fiscal received the decision (December 12, 1960) or from the date his private counsel in Manila received it (December 15, 1960). Petitioner contends that as he was sued in both official and private capacities, he could be represented by private counsel, and notice to the fiscal should not preclude his private counsel's appeal. The Supreme Court is asked to determine the correct starting point for the appeal period.
Issue(s)
Whether the judgment of the Court of First Instance became final upon the lapse of 15 days from December 12, 1960, when Fiscal Garcia received a copy of the decision, or upon the lapse of 15 days from December 15, 1960, when Congressman Felicisimo Ocampo received a copy of the decision.
Ruling
The appeal is dismissed, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The decision of the trial court dated December 2, 1960, was already final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the judgment became final upon the lapse of 15 days from December 12, 1960, when Fiscal Garcia received a copy of the decision. The Court found it unnecessary to delve into the question of who was the principal counsel, as the established jurisprudence dictates that notice to any one of the several counsel on record is equivalent to notice to all counsel. There was no proof on record that the Fiscal was withdrawn as counsel for the Governor, making him an attorney of record whose receipt of the decision binds the client. Citing Oliveros vs. Leola (51 O.G. 3450, No. L-6156, June 30, 1955), the Court reiterated that if none of the requirements for substitution of attorneys are met, notice sent to the original counsel starts the appeal period. Furthermore, referencing Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-14551, July 31, 1961), it was emphasized that withdrawal or dismissal of counsel must be by formal petition, and absent such, notice to counsel of record is notice to the client. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the period should be reckoned from Congressman Ocampo's receipt on December 15, 1960, the appeal filed on January 3, 1961, would still be late. For an action of mandamus, Section 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides a reglementary period of 15 days for appeal. Counting from December 16, 1960 (the day after Ocampo's receipt) to January 3, 1961, yields 19 days, which is 4 days beyond the prescribed 15-day period.
Main Doctrine
Notice of a decision to any one of several counsels of record is equivalent to notice to all, and the reglementary period for appeal commences from the date of receipt by any counsel of record, absent a formal substitution of counsel.