Commissioner of Immigration v. Romero
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondent Te Suat Eng, also known as Tai Shuet Ying, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration. She sought to be declared a citizen of the Philippines, to be free from arrest and detention under immigration laws, and to have her Alien Certificate of Registration canceled and replaced with a citizen's identification certificate. 2. Procedural History: The petition was filed on April 25, 1961, and the lower court granted a preliminary injunction. The Commissioner of Immigration failed to answer, leading to a default order on June 30, 1961. A decision was rendered on August 21, 1961, declaring Te Suat Eng a Philippine citizen and ordering the cancellation of her alien registration. The Commissioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the Commissioner filed a notice of appeal, which the lower court initially allowed on February 10, 1962. However, upon motion by the respondents, the lower court set aside its previous order and struck out the notice of appeal on March 19, 1962, asserting the Commissioner had no right to appeal due to the default. 3. The Petition: This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Commissioner of Immigration, seeking to compel the respondent Judge to give due course to the Commissioner's appeal. The petitioner argues that once an appeal is perfected, the lower court loses jurisdiction over the case. The petitioner contends that the appeal was perfected by the filing of the notice of appeal, as required for special civil actions and appeals by the Solicitor General, and therefore the lower court erred in vacating its order allowing the appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in setting aside its order giving due course to the appeal after the appeal had been perfected. Whether a party declared in default has the right to appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus, setting aside the order of March 19, 1962, and ordering the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner's appeal. The Court found that the order of March 19, 1962, was issued without jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the lower court's jurisdiction after appeal: The Court held that the principle laid down in previous cases is that once a case has been appealed and the appeal has been perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the subject thereof. Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that after the appeal is perfected, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. In this case, the appeal was perfected by the filing of the notice of appeal, as no record on appeal or appeal bond was necessary for a special civil action where the appellant is the Solicitor General. Therefore, the lower court erred in issuing the order of March 19, 1962, setting aside its previous order allowing the appeal. On the issue of a party declared in default appealing: The Court stated that this issue was beside the point for the present petition, as the object of the mandamus petition was to test the lower court's authority or jurisdiction to recall a case after the appeal had been perfected. The primary concern was the jurisdiction of the lower court to act on the case after the appeal was perfected, not the substantive right of a defaulted party to appeal.
Main Doctrine
Once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, except for specific protective and preservative orders not involving the litigated matter, and cannot subsequently set aside its order giving due course to the appeal.