Cruz v. Plaridel Surety & Insurance
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In the Intestate Estate of the late Maria de la Cruz, Margarita de la Cruz, the appellee, filed a motion on April 28, 1957, seeking an order for appellant Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety for the former administrator Teodorico Adsuara, to pay the estate the sum of P2,413.00. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance (CFI) initially denied the motion on April 29, 1957, deeming it "not the proper remedy." Subsequently, on November 28, 1957, the appellee filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CFI granted on December 9, 1957, setting aside the denial and ordering the appellant to pay the sum. The appellant moved for suspension and was allowed to file oppositions, arguing that the April 29 order had become final, that its liability required prior accounting with its intervention, that a separate action should be filed, and that the bond did not cover pre-existing obligations. On February 28, 1958, the CFI issued an order reconsidering its April 29, 1957 order and resetting the hearing for the administrator's motion. The Petition: The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from the February 28, 1958 order, asserting that the order sought to be reconsidered (April 29, 1957) had already become final and executory.
Issue(s)
Whether the order of April 29, 1957, denying the motion to compel payment by the surety, had become final and executory. Whether the lower court committed a reversible error in reconsidering its April 29, 1957 order.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that the lower court committed a reversible error in issuing the appealed order of February 28, 1958. The order appealed from is set aside, with costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the finality of the April 29, 1957 order: The Court reiterated the principle that what determines whether a judgment or order is final or interlocutory is whether it puts an end to the litigation or leaves something to be done on the merits. An order of dismissal is final, while an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory. In this case, the order of April 29, 1957, which denied the administrator's motion to compel the surety to pay, was a final disposition of the matter presented in that motion. Therefore, it was final in character, not merely interlocutory. The remedy of the appellee was to appeal from this order, especially since it was manifestly erroneous, as the liability of a surety is enforceable in the same probate proceeding after hearing all parties concerned. The appellee, however, failed to appeal and instead waited seven months before filing a motion for reconsideration. By then, the order of denial had already become executory. The Court cited Olsen & Co. vs. Olsen and Hodges vs. Villanueva in support of the definition of final and interlocutory orders. On the lower court's error in reconsidering the order: Consequently, the lower court committed a reversible error in issuing the appealed order of February 28, 1958. This order reconsidered the executory order of April 29, 1957, and reset for hearing a matter that had already been finally disposed of. The Court emphasized that once an order becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction to modify or set it aside, except for grounds of fraud, mistake, or excusable negligence, which were not invoked or established here. The appellee's motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, rendering the original denial order immutable.
Main Doctrine
An order denying a motion to compel a surety to pay the liability of a former administrator in a probate proceeding is final and executory, and a motion for reconsideration filed after the period for appeal has lapsed cannot revive the right to appeal.