Lu Do v. Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ordered Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. to pay its employees P8,413.93 as additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays at the rate of 25% of their daily wages. The CIR examiner's report indicated that the company claimed to have paid employees for eight hours of work even if they only worked six hours on Sundays and holidays, but the correctness of this claim could not be verified due to missing time cards. The examiner's second report computed the total extra pay at P8,413.93. Procedural History: The company vigorously opposed the examiner's report, insisting it paid employees for eight hours despite only six hours of work on Sundays and holidays. A new union, PELU, intervened. Initially, the CIR, through Judge Martinez, sustained the company's opposition and disapproved the examiner's report, giving weight to the testimonies of 20 company witnesses and the timekeeper who stated employees worked six hours but were paid for eight. PELU's motion for reconsideration was dismissed for not being verified. Subsequently, the CIR en banc reversed Judge Martinez's decision, ordering the company to pay P8,413.93, reasoning that the 'X' mark on payrolls should be considered eight hours of work for all employees, similar to how it was treated for guards, and that the company's claim of six hours was mere guesswork. The Petition: The company appealed the CIR en banc's resolution, arguing that the CIR erred in giving more weight to the examiner's second report over the testimonies of its twenty witnesses, in basing its resolution on a contradictory opinion, and in entertaining a motion for reconsideration that was already dismissed.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Industrial Relations erred in giving more weight to the second report of its examiner which contradicted his first report, over the firm, affirmative, and uniform testimonies of twenty witnesses for the company. Whether the Court of Industrial Relations erred in basing its resolution on an opinion contradictory to the evidence presented by the company, consisting of the positive, firm, and uniform testimonies of twenty witnesses. Whether the Court of Industrial Relations erred in entertaining a motion for reconsideration that was already dismissed under a prior and final resolution for not being in accordance with the court's rules.
Ruling
The resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated March 2, 1961, is hereby set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of weighing evidence and the examiner's report versus company witnesses: The Supreme Court found that the CIR erred in giving more weight to the second report of its examiner, which contradicted his first report, over the "positive, firm and uniform" testimonies of twenty witnesses for the company. The Court emphasized that while findings of the CIR on evidence are generally conclusive, they are not binding if unsupported by substantial or credible proof. The Court noted that the trial judge, who initially heard the witnesses, characterized the company's witnesses' testimonies as "positive, firm and uniform" and the union's witnesses' testimonies as "contradictory and conflicting." The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that affirmative testimony is stronger than negative testimony, and the examiner's statement that he considered 'X' as eight hours because there was no evidence to the contrary was a negative assertion, weaker than the positive declarations of the company's witnesses. The Court also found the company's explanation that 'X' represented six hours of work paid as eight hours to be more credible, as it meant the employees were already compensated for the differentials. On the interpretation of 'X' mark on payrolls: The Supreme Court clarified that the mere fact that the company admitted 'X' to mean eight hours of work for guards does not automatically mean it must mean the same for other classes of employees, nor does it justify the inference that it must mean eight hours for Sunday and holiday differentials when the company's witnesses positively testified to working only six hours but being paid for eight. The Court found the company's evidence, supported by the testimonies of its witnesses and timekeeper, to be more persuasive than the CIR en banc's reasoning that 'X' must uniformly mean eight hours for all purposes. The Court highlighted that the company's witnesses testified about their working hours a few years prior to the hearing, which was not mere guesswork but a recollection of their work practices during the period in question. On the procedural issue of entertaining a motion for reconsideration: While the Court did not explicitly discuss the third assignment of error regarding the motion for reconsideration, its decision to set aside the CIR en banc's resolution implies that the procedural issue, or the substantive issues that led to the reversal, rendered the prior dismissal of the motion for reconsideration moot or that the subsequent actions of the CIR en banc were considered in light of the overall merits of the case. The Court's focus remained on the substantive evidence presented by the company and the proper weighing thereof by the lower court.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations ordering the company to pay additional compensation for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, finding that the company's evidence, consisting of the positive, firm, and uniform testimonies of twenty witnesses, was more credible than the conflicting testimonies of the union's witnesses and the court examiner's report, especially since the company's payroll entries ('X') were shown to represent six hours of work paid as eight hours, thus exceeding the required differentials.