People v. Sabbun
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The fiscal filed an information accusing the accused-appellee of violating Republic Act No. 145. The accused-appellee, who assisted spouses Benito Dacquioag and Juana Acluba Vda. de Dacquioag in preparing and prosecuting their claims for benefits under laws administered by the United States Veterans Administration, was alleged to have unlawfully solicited, charged, and received fees in excess of the amount authorized by law. Specifically, the accused allegedly collected P600.00 in December 1949, P1,480.00 from January 1950 to February 1956, and P170.00 from March 1956 to September 1957, totaling P2,210.00 in excess of the authorized P20.00 per claim. Procedural History: Counsel for the accused moved to quash the information, arguing that the criminal action had been extinguished and that the information charged more than one offense. The trial court sustained the motion with respect to collections made four years prior to the filing of the information but denied it for collections made within the four-year period. The Petition: The Republic appealed the trial court's order, contending that the offense charged is a continuing offense and that the prescriptive period began from September 1957 when the crime was discovered. The Republic also argued that the prescriptive period is eight years, not four years.
Issue(s)
Whether the offense charged is a continuing offense. Whether the prescriptive period for the offense has expired.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the order appealed from and ordered the court below to proceed with the case. The Court held that the offense charged is a continuing offense and has not yet prescribed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the offense charged is a continuing offense: The Court held that the offense charged is a continuing offense. The initial collection of P600.00 in 1949, as well as subsequent collections up to September 1957, were all integral parts of the same offense. The periodical collections, including P600.00 in December 1949, P1,480.00 from January 1950 to February 1956, and P170.00 from March 1956 to September 1957, were all part of the fees agreed upon for services rendered in filing the claim and collecting pensions. These periodical collections were impelled by the same motive and made under the same criminal impulse, thus constituting a single criminal offense of collecting a fee exceeding the prescribed amount fixed by law. The Court cited People vs. Lawas (G.R. No. L-7618, June 30, 1955) in support of this reasoning, emphasizing that the offense should not be divided into separate acts, each subject to prescription independently. On the issue of whether the prescriptive period for the offense has expired: Since the offense was determined to be continuing in nature, the prescriptive period began to run from the last act of collection, which occurred in September 1957. As the information was filed on January 19, 1959, and the last act of collection was within the prescriptive period (which the Court implies is longer than the four years considered by the trial court, and likely eight years as argued by the appellant), the offense had not yet prescribed at the time the information was filed. Therefore, the trial court erred in quashing the information with respect to collections made four years prior to its filing.
Main Doctrine
The offense of collecting fees in excess of the prescribed amount under Republic Act No. 145, when committed through periodical collections, constitutes a continuing offense, and the prescriptive period begins from the last act of collection, provided it is within the prescriptive period.