Acibo v. Macadaeg
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originated from an ejectment suit filed by Dr. Maria Paz Mendoza-Guazon against 56 individuals, including the 31 petitioners, for unlawfully withholding possession of a parcel of land in Paco, Manila. The Municipal Court ruled in favor of Dr. Mendoza-Guazon, ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and pay back rents. The defendants were also ordered to pay rents from September 1961 until they vacated the property. 2. Procedural History: The defendants appealed the Municipal Court's decision to the Court of First Instance of Manila. However, the Court of First Instance ordered the immediate execution of the judgment, finding that the defendants had failed to file a supersedeas bond as required by law. The defendants subsequently sought to file supersedeas bonds and suspend the execution, while Dr. Mendoza-Guazon moved for an order of demolition to clear the property. The Court of First Instance denied the defendants' motion to suspend execution, disapproved their filed bonds, and ordered the demolition of the houses on the property. A writ of demolition was issued and subsequently carried out by the sheriff. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to set aside the demolition order and compel the respondent judge to approve their supersedeas bonds. They argued that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion by refusing to suspend the execution and approve their bonds, and by allegedly denying them reasonable time to remove their houses. The petitioners contended that the lower court should have granted them time to file the supersedeas bond and that the demolition order was issued without due process and without affording them a reasonable period to vacate.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to suspend the execution of the appealed decision and in disapproving the supersedeas bonds filed by the petitioners. Whether the petitioners were denied due process and reasonable time to remove their houses prior to demolition.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the refusal to suspend execution and disapprove bonds: The Court reiterated that under Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case is mandated unless the defendant perfects an appeal and files a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the inferior court, and further, deposits from time to time the rent due during the pendency of the appeal. The petitioners failed to comply with these requirements by not filing the supersedeas bond and not making the required deposits. The Court emphasized that the duty of the lower court to order immediate execution in such cases is ministerial and imperative, with no exceptions unless delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The cited cases of Igama v. Soria and Tolentino v. Court of First Instance of Manila were distinguished, as the discretion to allow filing of a supersedeas bond is not absolute and can be denied. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a supersedeas bond answers only for back rents and damages up to the perfection of the appeal, not for future rents, which are guaranteed by periodic cash deposits. The CFI has no authority to accept a bond in lieu of cash deposits for future rents. On denial of due process and reasonable time for demolition: The Court found no denial of due process. The motion for demolition and the opposition were set for hearing, and the court deemed them submitted for resolution without oral arguments, which is permissible as oral argument is not essential to due process. The parties were able to present their respective positions through their pleadings. Regarding the claim of lack of service of the demolition order, the Court noted that since the demolition order itself was not appealable, service of the order prior to the issuance of the writ of demolition was not necessary. The petitioners were given from April 17, 1962 (when the writ was served) until April 26, 1962 (when demolition was carried out), a period of nine days, which the Court considered sufficient time to remove their houses.
Main Doctrine
The failure to file a supersedeas bond or to deposit current rents as required by Rule 70, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, justifies the immediate execution of a judgment in an unlawful detainer case, and the duty of the court in this respect is ministerial and imperative. The Court of First Instance has no authority to accept a bond in lieu of cash deposits for future rents.