Villa-Rey Transit v. Bello
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute arose from a complaint for damages filed by Florentina Asuncion and others against Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. The plaintiffs sought compensation for the death of Felipe Tejada, who was the husband and father of the private respondents. The transportation company's principal defense in the original action was the alleged negligence of a third party, rather than any fault on the part of the deceased. Procedural History: On September 18, 1961, the respondent Judge declared Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. in default for failing to file an answer. A default judgment was rendered on September 23, 1961, awarding P70,100.00 in damages. An execution was issued, and the company's properties were levied upon. Villa-Rey Transit filed motions to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment. However, before these motions could be resolved, the company filed a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. L-18957) with the Supreme Court, challenging the default order, judgment, and writ of execution. The Supreme Court issued an injunction but ultimately denied the petition on April 23, 1963, dissolving the injunction and affirming the lower court's orders as not constituting grave abuse of discretion. Subsequently, Villa-Rey Transit filed a motion to reset the hearing of its earlier motions, which the respondent Judge denied, deeming the motions abandoned due to the prior certiorari petition. The Judge then ordered the re-issuance of the writ of execution. The Petition: Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. filed the present petition for Mandamus and Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, arguing that the Supreme Court's prior ruling that the initial certiorari proceeding was premature implied that the lower court should still rule on the pending motions to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment. The petitioner contended that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected his duty by denying a hearing for these motions. The Supreme Court, however, found no abuse of discretion, stating that its prior decision did not intend for the lower court to reconsider the same orders already deemed legal and valid. The Court further held that the petitioner's actions constituted an attempt to pursue two courses of action simultaneously and that the proper remedy, if any, would have been an appeal, not mandamus, as there was no longer a pending motion before the trial court.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the petitioner abandoned its motions for new trial and to lift the default order by filing a premature petition for certiorari. Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the trial court to reset the hearing of the abandoned motions.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus and certiorari, affirmed the order of the respondent judge, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court ruled that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion and that mandamus does not lie.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that the motions were abandoned. The Court reasoned that when Villa-Rey Transit filed the first petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-18957 without waiting for the trial court’s resolution on its motions, it effectively placed itself at the disposal of the Supreme Court and bypassed the lower court's processes. This move was characterized by the Court as a 'gamble' where the petitioner tried to seek a shortcut to victory. The Court applied the principle that a party cannot take two courses of action at once, noting that 'one cannot eat his cake and have it too.' Since the petitioner chose to challenge the legality of the default orders directly in the higher court, it could not later claim the right to proceed with the very motions it had effectively superseded by its own procedural choice. Furthermore, the SC's previous decision had already affirmed the legality and validity of the trial court's orders, making any further deliberation on them by the lower court redundant and unnecessary. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that mandamus does not lie in this case because there was no clear legal duty for the judge to perform. Mandamus is only available to compel the performance of a ministerial duty or the exercise of a right from which a party was unlawfully excluded. Because the motions were deemed abandoned, the petitioner no longer possessed a right to have them heard, and the respondent judge was under no obligation to reset them. The Court further clarified that even if the judge's conclusion regarding the abandonment was an error of law, such errors are not correctable by certiorari or mandamus if done in the valid exercise of jurisdiction. The proper remedy for a denial of a motion to lift an order of default or for a new trial is an appeal from the judgment, not a special civil action. Consequently, since the petitioner failed to pursue the correct remedial path and the motions were legally non-existent due to abandonment, the petition for mandamus was denied.
Main Doctrine
A party who files a petition for certiorari before the trial court has had the opportunity to rule on its pending motions for new trial or to set aside judgment is deemed to have abandoned said motions, and the subsequent denial of a motion to reset the hearing of these abandoned motions does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the proper remedy after denial of such motions, if erroneous, is appeal, not mandamus.