Recto v. Bardos
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns an alleged appropriation and obstruction of a public creek situated between the properties of Artemio Recto and Brigida A. Bardos. Bardos filed a complaint with the Bureau of Public Works, asserting that Recto had illegally filled and obstructed the creek. The Bureau, after hearings, ordered Recto to remove the obstruction and restore the creek to its original condition within thirty days, warning of judicial action if he failed to comply. 2. Procedural History: Following the Bureau of Public Works' decision ordering the removal of the obstruction, Recto received the decision on October 25, 1958. He filed a petition for review and reconsideration on November 20, 1958, which was opposed by Bardos. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications endorsed Recto's petition for further action on December 8, 1958, but ultimately denied the petition on February 27, 1959. Recto received notice of this denial on April 13, 1959. Subsequently, Recto filed an action in the Court of First Instance on April 16, 1959, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Secretary's decision. Both Bardos and the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, primarily on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and the expiration of the appeal period. The Court of First Instance dismissed Recto's complaint, ruling that the action was filed beyond the thirty-day period from notice of the Secretary's decision. 3. The Petition: Artemio Recto, as plaintiff-appellant, appealed the dismissal order of the Court of First Instance. His primary argument on appeal is that the lower court erred in dismissing his complaint. Recto contends that the thirty-day period for filing an appeal to the Court of First Instance from the Secretary's decision should have been suspended by his motion for reconsideration. He argues that the Secretary's endorsement of his motion for reconsideration, after the initial thirty-day period had seemingly expired, indicated an acknowledgment that the period was indeed suspended. Therefore, his subsequent filing of the judicial action was timely, and the lower court's dismissal based on the lapse of the appeal period was erroneous.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration suspends the period for appealing an administrative decision to the Court of First Instance. Whether the appeal filed by Recto was timely.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal was filed on time. The order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance was set aside, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration suspends the period for appealing an administrative decision to the Court of First Instance: The Court distinguished the present case from the ruling in Enriquez v. People of the Philippines. In Enriquez, the suspension of the period contemplated by Section 25-A of Act 2152 referred to the period for compliance with the removal order, not the period for appeal. In the instant case, the issue is the period within which to appeal to the Court of First Instance from the decision of the Secretary. The Court held that the law does not prevent an aggrieved party from moving for reconsideration, which is a standard procedure, especially when exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. It is logical that where a motion for reconsideration is filed, the period for appeal should be deemed suspended. The Court noted that the Secretary's endorsement of the motion for reconsideration on December 8, 1958, which was after the initial thirty-day period had expired, indicated that the Secretary himself considered the period to be suspended. Therefore, the action below was filed on time. On whether the appeal filed by Recto was timely: Based on the reasoning above, the Court concluded that Recto's appeal was timely. He received the decision on October 25, 1958, filed a motion for reconsideration on November 20, 1958, and received the denial of his motion on April 13, 1959. The appeal was filed on April 16, 1959. The Court found that the period for appeal was suspended by the motion for reconsideration, making the subsequent filing of the appeal within the reglementary period after notice of the denial of the motion.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period to appeal an administrative decision suspends the running of the period for filing an appeal to the Court of First Instance.