Gallarde v. Moran
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Dionisio B. Gallarde alleged that in 1954, he permitted defendants Cesar S. Moran and Liboria L. Moran to occupy his urban land, with the understanding that they would pay monthly rentals, initially P15.00, later reduced to P12.00, and then to P10.00, payable in advance. The defendants were irregular in their payments. Procedural History: On June 2, 1961, Gallarde filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against the Morans in the Court of First Instance of Agusan. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other grounds, that the complaint lacked a cause of action because it failed to allege a prior demand to vacate in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Gallarde appealed the dismissal order. The Appeal: The plaintiff-appellant sought the reversal of the trial court's order of dismissal. The core of his argument, implicitly, was that the complaint sufficiently alleged a demand to vacate, thereby satisfying the procedural prerequisite for an ejectment suit. He contended that the lower court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Issue(s)
Whether the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged a demand to vacate as required by Section 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, thereby establishing a cause of action for ejectment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The Court held that the complaint failed to allege facts establishing a cause of action conformably to Section 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, which requires a prior demand to vacate.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court found the appeal to be without merit, upholding the trial court's dismissal of the ejectment complaint. The Court meticulously examined the complaint and concluded that it "fails absolutely to make allegations establishing a cause of action conformably to the above Rule" (referring to Section 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court). The rule explicitly mandates that no landlord shall bring an ejectment action unless the tenant has failed to pay rent or comply with lease conditions for a specified period after a demand has been made. The complaint's allegations regarding a demand were deemed insufficient: the first "demand" was conditional, merely stating that the plaintiff would demand vacation if defendants were not agreeable to a rental increase, and there was no allegation that the defendants refused to agree. The second alleged "demand" was too indefinite, inferentially stating a demand was made but not specifying when, thus failing to meet the requirement that the demand be made at least fifteen days (or five days for buildings) before filing the action. Furthermore, the complaint did not specify that the demand was made for failure to pay rent or comply with lease conditions, nor did it allege that the demand was made in the manner prescribed by the rule – personally, by written notice, or by posting.
Main Doctrine
The Court affirmed the dismissal of an ejectment complaint due to the plaintiff's failure to allege and prove compliance with the mandatory requirement under Section 2 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. This rule mandates that no landlord shall bring an action against a tenant for failure to pay rent or comply with lease conditions unless a demand to vacate has been made at least fifteen days (or five days for buildings) prior to the filing of the suit, and such demand must be made personally, by written notice, or by posting if no person is found on the premises. The complaint's allegations of demand were found to be conditional, indefinite, and lacking in the required procedural formalities, thus failing to establish a valid cause of action.