Hojilla v. Mariño
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Edgardo R. Hojilla, a civil service eligible, was appointed Chairman of the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration on March 24, 1953. His appointment included a proviso allowing for termination at any time, without proceedings, at the pleasure of the President of the Philippines. This position was later classified by WAPCO as Hearing Officer II, Range 39. Procedural History: On January 23, 1962, Hojilla was notified by the Commissioner of Immigration that his appointment had been terminated effective immediately by the President. Hojilla sought reconsideration from the President, arguing that his separation was summary, without cause, and without due process, violating constitutional and Civil Service Law safeguards. When this failed, he initiated a petition for quo warranto directly before the Supreme Court, seeking reinstatement and back pay. The Petition: Hojilla's petition for quo warranto argues that his appointment, despite the proviso, could not be terminated without cause and due process because he is a civil service eligible, his appointment should be interpreted in light of the Civil Service Act of 1959, he exercises quasi-judicial powers, and the WAPCO classification granted permanence to his tenure. The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asserted the validity of the termination based on the explicit terms of the appointment.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner, as a civil service eligible, is protected by the security of tenure provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Service Act of 1959 against summary termination. Whether the classification of his position by WAPCO grants him permanence of tenure. Whether the exercise of quasi-judicial powers by the petitioner affects the nature of his appointment and tenure.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's appointment, despite his civil service eligibility, was terminable at the pleasure of the President and thus essentially temporary, allowing for termination without cause or hearing. The WAPCO classification and the nature of his duties did not alter the temporary character of his appointment.
Ratio Decidendi
On the petitioner's civil service eligibility and security of tenure: The Court held that petitioner's status as a civil service eligible does not shield him from termination when his appointment was made under Section 27(a) of Commonwealth Act 613, which explicitly states that the appointee is "removable at (his) pleasure." The proviso in his appointment, allowing termination "anytime, without any proceedings, at the pleasure of the President of the Philippines," rendered his appointment, in essence, temporary. Consequently, he cannot invoke the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution and Section 32 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, which requires cause and due process for removal or suspension. The Court cited Cuadra v. Cordova to emphasize that a temporary appointment, dependent on the pleasure of the appointing power, can be terminated at a moment's notice without cause. On the effect of WAPCO classification: The Court clarified that the Reorganization Act of 1954, which authorized WAPCO to classify government positions, did not grant WAPCO the authority to change the nature of appointments from temporary to permanent. Neither Republic Act 997 nor any executive order implementing the Reorganization Plan conferred such power. Therefore, the WAPCO classification of petitioner's position as Hearing Officer II, Range 39, did not alter the fundamental nature of his appointment as being terminable at the pleasure of the President. On the exercise of quasi-judicial powers: The Court stated that the nature of the duties or functions performed by an appointee does not determine the security of tenure; rather, it is the nature of the appointment itself that is determinative. Therefore, the fact that petitioner exercised quasi-judicial powers as Chairman of the Board of Special Inquiry did not grant him any stability in his tenure, as his appointment remained temporary in character.
Main Doctrine
An appointment made under a provision of law that allows termination at the pleasure of the appointing power, even if held by a civil service eligible, is essentially temporary in nature and can be terminated without cause and without prior hearing, notwithstanding the general security of tenure provisions for civil service employees.