Suarez v. Republic
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the adoption of a minor, Engracio Guligado, Jr., the son of Captain Engracio Guligado and Guneng T. Guligado. The minor's mother is the sister of the petitioner, Mrs. Dintoy Tan Suarez. Shortly after the child's birth, his parents left him in the custody of Mrs. Suarez, who has since provided for his upbringing, support, and education, treating him as her own son. The natural parents have since relocated. Procedural History: Mrs. Dintoy Tan Suarez filed a petition for the adoption of Engracio Guligado, Jr. in the Court of First Instance of Sulu. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, opposed the adoption. The lower court granted the petition, allowing the minor to adopt the petitioner's surname. The Republic of the Philippines appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Petition: The appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, argues that the lower court erred in authorizing the adoption due to the alleged lack of competent proof of consent from the natural parents. Furthermore, the appellant contends that the minor should not be permitted to bear the petitioner's surname as a married woman, as her husband did not join in the adoption petition. The Supreme Court considered the appeal, agreeing with the appellant on the surname issue while affirming the adoption itself, with a modification regarding the surname.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in authorizing the adoption despite the alleged absence of competent proof of the consent of the natural parents. Whether the lower court erred in permitting the minor to bear the petitioner's surname as a married woman, despite her husband not joining in the adoption.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court in granting the adoption but modified it by ordering that the minor shall hereafter be known as Engracio Tan, not Engracio Tan Suarez.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the natural parents' consent: The lower court did not err in overruling the objection to the admission of the sworn statement of the natural parents consenting to the adoption. Although no testimonial evidence was presented to identify the signatures, the statement was duly authenticated by a Notary Public. Furthermore, other evidence on record strongly indicated the authenticity of the statement. The Court found that the written consent, confirmed by a sworn statement before a notary public, was sufficient proof of the natural parents' conformity to the adoption. On the issue of the minor bearing the petitioner's married surname: The Court agreed with the appellant that the minor cannot bear the petitioner's surname as a married woman because her husband did not join in the adoption petition. The Court reasoned that allowing the minor to use the surname of the adopter's husband, who is not an adopter, would mislead the public into believing that the husband also adopted the child. This could lead to confusion, particularly concerning successional rights. To forestall such befuddling situations, the Court strictly applied the provision of the Civil Code that an adopted child should use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, not one acquired by marriage. The Court cited the case of In re Adoption of Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana (L-18284, April 30, 1963) in support of this ruling.
Main Doctrine
While the written consent of the natural parents, duly notarized, is sufficient proof of their consent to an adoption, an adopted child cannot use the surname of the adopter's spouse if the spouse did not join in the adoption petition, to avoid confusion regarding legal rights and relationships.