Delfin v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The City Fiscal of Iloilo filed an information for malversation of public funds against David Delfin, the Sales Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Iloilo Branch. Delfin was accused of misappropriating P20,058.29 out of P21,122.40 representing the value of PCSO tickets entrusted to him. Procedural History: The accused pleaded not guilty. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, finding that the prosecution had established a prima facie case. Subsequently, Delfin filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to dismiss the case. The Court of Appeals denied this petition. The Petition: Delfin appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the PCSO is a private office, its employees are not public officers, and its funds are not public funds, thus arguing that the elements of malversation were not present and the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the information for malversation, given the petitioner's claim that the elements of "public officer" and "public funds" were absent. Whether the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus are available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as an appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, denying the petition for prohibition and mandamus. The Court held that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion and that the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law through appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that, even assuming arguendo the petitioner's theory was correct—that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office's (PCSO) employees are not public officers and its funds are not public funds—the trial court cannot be said to have gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the information. The Court reasoned that even without the specific elements of "public officer" and "public funds," the information for malversation could still suffice for a conviction of a lesser offense, namely estafa. This Court has consistently ruled that a person charged under an information for malversation of public funds can indeed be convicted of estafa if the funds are found to be private funds, because estafa is considered a lesser, cognate offense included in malversation. Therefore, the trial court's decision to proceed with the trial and its denial of the motion to dismiss did not constitute a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, which is the standard for grave abuse of discretion. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court definitively ruled that the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus cannot be resorted to by the petitioner in this case because he possesses an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, specifically an appeal in due time from the decision that the trial court might eventually render. Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy granted only to compel a tribunal to desist from proceedings that are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Similarly, mandamus can only be commanded in the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The Court squarely applied its ruling in Solidum v. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-16570, February 28, 1963), which involved a petition for prohibition and/or mandamus filed upon the denial of a motion to quash. In Solidum, the Court held that the "obvious and only remedy available to the appellee is appeal in due time." Since the petitioner in this case has a complete remedy at law by way of appeal, the conditions for granting prohibition and mandamus are not met.
Main Doctrine
A petition for prohibition and mandamus will not prosper if the petitioner has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as appeal. Furthermore, even if the elements of 'public officer' and 'public funds' are wanting for malversation, the information can still suffice for conviction of estafa, as the latter is a lesser, cognate offense included in malversation.