Carreon v. Carreon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Rodolfo Carreon and three others were elected Municipal Mayor and Municipal Councilors, respectively, of Dapitan in 1959, to serve until December 31, 1963. On June 22, 1963, Republic Act No. 3811, creating the City of Dapitan, was approved. On September 5, 1963, petitioners filed their certificates of candidacy for the positions of City Mayor and City Councilors of Dapitan City. The Secretary of Justice opined that petitioners should be considered resigned as of the filing of their certificates of candidacy. The President proclaimed November 8, 1963, as the date for the formal organization of Dapitan City and appointed respondents Germanico Carreon as City Mayor and three others as City Councilors. In the November 12, 1963 elections, respondents Germanico Carreon, Herminio Acaylar, and Justino Saldon won as City Mayor and City Councilors-elect. Procedural History: On December 3, 1963, petitioners initiated quo warranto proceedings seeking to oust the respondents and to be declared entitled to the positions. A preliminary injunction was issued, stopping salary payments to respondents until the end of December 1963. The Petition: Petitioners claimed entitlement to the positions based on Section 86 of Republic Act No. 3811, which states that the City Government shall be organized upon approval of the Act and incumbent municipal officials shall continue in office until the expiration of their terms.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioners, by filing certificates of candidacy for City Mayor and City Councilors, were considered resigned from their positions as Municipal Mayor and Municipal Councilors, respectively, pursuant to Section 27 of the Election Code. Whether the City Government of Dapitan was organized and existing upon the approval of its charter (R.A. 3811) on June 22, 1963.
Ruling
The writ of quo warranto applied for is granted. Respondents are declared not entitled to hold the office of mayor and councilors of the City of Dapitan prior to January 1, 1964. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, and the petitioners are declared entitled to the corresponding salaries withheld under said writ.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether petitioners were considered resigned: The Court held that petitioners were not considered resigned. The core of the issue lies in determining what positions petitioners held on September 5, 1963, when they filed their certificates of candidacy. The Court found that upon the approval of Republic Act No. 3811 on June 22, 1963, the City of Dapitan was organized and its government began to exist. This existence of the city government rendered the municipal government of Dapitan, which occupied the same territory and performed similar functions, incompatible and superseded. Therefore, the petitioners, who were incumbent municipal officials, automatically became city officials of Dapitan City by operation of law, continuing in their respective positions until the expiration of their original terms on December 31, 1963. They could not remain municipal officials of a non-existent municipality; they could only continue as officials of the existing city. Consequently, when they filed their certificates of candidacy for City Mayor and City Councilors, they were running for the same positions they were already holding as city officials, thus not triggering the resignation provision under Section 27 of the Election Code. On the issue of the organization of the City Government: The Court affirmed that the City Government of Dapitan was organized and existing upon the approval of its charter, Republic Act No. 3811, on June 22, 1963. This is explicitly stated in Section 86 of the charter, which provides that the City Government shall be organized upon the approval of the Act. Unlike the charter in the Mejia vs. Bololong case, which required a specific date fixed by the President for organization, R.A. 3811 mandated organization upon its approval. The Court reasoned that the legislative intent was for the city government to come into being immediately upon the charter's enactment, superseding the municipal government. The provision that incumbent municipal officials would continue in office until the expiration of their terms meant they would continue as city officials, not as municipal officials of a defunct municipality. The Court emphasized that the municipality and the city, having the same territory and functions, could not coexist, and the law did not intend for such a scenario.
Main Doctrine
The organization of a city government under its charter, upon approval of the charter, supersedes the existing municipal government within the same territory, and incumbent municipal officials automatically become city officials, continuing in office until the expiration of their original terms, unless otherwise provided.