Tanjanco v. Santos

G.R. No. L-18630 · 1966-12-17 · J. REYES, J.B.L., J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Damages
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The plaintiff, Araceli Santos, alleged that the defendant, Apolonio Tanjanco, courted her from December 1957, professing love and promising marriage. Relying on these promises, she acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge, which occurred regularly until December 1959, resulting in her pregnancy. Due to her condition, she resigned from her job, becoming unable to support herself and her unborn child. She claimed damages for mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation due to the defendant's refusal to marry her. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals reversed this dismissal, holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code, although it agreed that there was no cause of action for compelling recognition or support of an unborn child. The Petition: The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that actions for breach of promise to marry are not permissible and citing previous rulings.

Issue(s)

Whether the complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code based on a breach of promise to marry and subsequent sexual intercourse. Whether the facts alleged constitute seduction as contemplated by law and jurisprudence.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal of the complaint by the Court of First Instance. The Court held that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code, nor do they establish seduction.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of whether the complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code: The Court found that the allegations in the complaint, which described a consensual sexual relationship between two adults over a period of one year, did not fall within the purview of Article 21. Article 21 requires an act that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and the Court clarified that a mere breach of promise to marry, without more, is not actionable under this article. The Court emphasized that the Code Commission's intent in providing Article 21 was to cover situations of seduction, which involves deceit, enticement, superior power, or abuse of confidence, leading a woman to yield her virtue. The facts presented did not demonstrate such deceit or abuse, but rather a voluntary and prolonged intimate relationship between consenting adults. The Court noted that the plaintiff, being of adult age, maintained these relations for a year without exacting early fulfillment of the promises, which is incompatible with the concept of seduction. Therefore, no cause of action for damages under Article 21 was established. On the issue of whether the facts alleged constitute seduction: The Court distinguished seduction from mere sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry. Citing jurisprudence, the Court defined seduction as involving deceit, enticement, superior power, or abuse of confidence, where the woman yields because of these inducements. The Court found that the plaintiff's allegations described a situation where she voluntarily acceded to repeated sexual intercourse over an extended period, based on mutual affection and repeated promises of marriage. This conduct was deemed incompatible with the concept of seduction, as it indicated willingness arising from mutual passion rather than from deceit or undue influence. The Court reiterated that if the willingness arises from sexual desire or curiosity, and the defendant merely affords the opportunity, it is not seduction. Consequently, the alleged acts did not meet the legal definition of seduction.

Main Doctrine

A mere breach of a promise to marry, without more, does not constitute a cause of action for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code, as the same requires that the act be contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and the element of seduction, which involves deceit or abuse of confidence, must be present. Voluntary sexual intercourse between adults, even if induced by a promise of marriage, does not automatically equate to seduction.

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