Gonzalez v. Encarnacion
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Thomas M. Gonzalez filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against Demetrio B. Encarnacion, alleging that Encarnacion filed a pleading captioned "Reply and Answer to Counterclaim" in Civil Case No. N-151, which contained allegedly libelous, derogatory, and scurrilous words against Gonzalez's personal worth, integrity, honor, and reputation, and was impertinent, immaterial, and irrelevant to the issues in Civil Case No. N-151. The complaint was later amended to include Venancio H. Aquino, Encarnacion's counsel, as a co-defendant. Procedural History: Encarnacion filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of stating no cause of action and improper venue/lack of jurisdiction. The trial court initially denied this motion. However, upon reconsideration and considering a similar motion to dismiss filed by Aquino, the trial court reversed its earlier order and dismissed the complaint. The trial court reasoned that under Republic Act 1289, the court where the civil action for damages was first filed (Civil Case N-151 in Cavite) should acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts, and the claim should have been brought as a counterclaim in that case to avoid multiplicity of suits. The Petition: Gonzalez appealed the dismissal orders, arguing that the venue of his complaint was not improperly laid because Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 1289, allows a civil action for damages in cases of written defamation to be filed in the court of first instance of the province where the offended party resides.
Issue(s)
Whether the venue for a civil action for damages based on written defamation contained in a judicial pleading is restricted to the court where said pleading was filed, or if it may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where the offended party resides.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the orders appealed from and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. The Court ruled that the venue was not improperly laid and that the Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the venue was properly laid in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cagayan. In interpreting Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) 1289, the Court emphasized that the law establish a general rule that actions for written defamation 'shall' be filed in the CFI of the province or city where 'any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides.' The Court applied the precedent in Dizon v. Encarnacion, which clarified that the term 'shall' in the first sentence of the provision is mandatory, limiting the plaintiff's choice to the residence of either party. The Court further noted that the second sentence, which uses the word 'may' regarding the place of publication, is merely permissive and provides a third choice of venue for the plaintiff's benefit. This permissive option is intended to allow the offended party to avoid giving additional publicity to the libelous statements in their home province if the circulation occurred elsewhere. The Court rejected the lower court's 'multiplicity of suits' theory, stating that the specific venue rules for libel under Art. 360 RPC must be followed. Consequently, since Gonzalez resided in Cagayan, he was legally entitled to bring the suit there, and the CFI of Cagayan had no basis to dismiss the case for improper venue.
Main Doctrine
The venue for a civil action for damages arising from written defamation may be filed in the court of the province where the offended party resides, or where any of the accused resides. The provision allowing filing where the libel was published or circulated is permissive and for the benefit of the offended party, which may be waived.