Bantoto v. Vallejo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Crispin Vallejo was the registered owner of a "jeepney" operated by Salvador Bobis. On October 24, 1948, the "jeepney", through the driver's negligence, struck and killed a 3-year-old girl, Damiana Bantoto. The driver, Salvador Bobis, was charged with homicide through reckless imprudence, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to imprisonment and to indemnify the deceased girl's heirs (appellees) in the sum of P3,000.00. Procedural History: The parents of the deceased, Vicente Bantoto and Florita Lanceta, filed a civil action against Salvador Bobis, Juan Maceda, and Crispin Vallejo, seeking to hold them solidarily responsible for damages, including the civil indemnity awarded in the criminal case, plus moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Vallejo moved to dismiss, arguing lack of cause of action due to the absence of an averment of Bobis' insolvency. The court overruled the motion. Vallejo answered, raising defenses including lack of cause of action, subsidiary liability, bar by prior judgment, and satisfaction of liability. Bobis was declared in default. At the trial, the writ of execution against Bobis and the sheriff's return nulla bona were admitted as evidence over Vallejo's objection. Vallejo presented no evidence. The trial court absolved Maceda and rendered judgment against Vallejo for civil indemnity, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The Petition: Crispin Vallejo appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning errors concerning the denial of his motion to dismiss, the admission of evidence, and the award of damages and attorney's fees.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of a cause of action against the appellant, Crispin Vallejo. Whether the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the writ of execution against the driver and the sheriff's return nulla bona. Whether the trial court erred in condemning the defendant-appellant to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the decision of the trial court. It eliminated the award of exemplary damages but doubled the award for attorney's fees. The appellant was ordered to pay the indemnity of P3,000.00 with interest, plus P1,000.00 in attorney's fees. The decision was affirmed in all other respects.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged lack of cause of action: The Court held that the master's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code is not predicated upon the insolvency of the employee. The insolvency of the servant is only a condition precedent for the enforcement of the master's liability by execution levy, not for the rendition of judgment against the master. The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility means that the latter's property cannot be seized without first exhausting that of the servant, unless the master cannot point out available property of the debtor sufficient to cover the debt. The Court clarified that the passage in Marquez vs. Castillo requiring insolvency was obiter dictum, as the ratio decidendi in that case was that the accident did not occur in the performance of the driver's assigned duties. On the admission of evidence: The Court found the second assigned error to be non-prejudicial, if at all committed. Even if the writ of execution and sheriff's return were not admissible against the master, they would be material and admissible when the issuance of a writ of execution against the master is demanded. The Court reiterated that in the absence of collusion, the judgment convicting the servant is conclusive in an action to enforce the master's subsidiary liability. Since the driver was also a defendant, the writ of execution and its return were not irrelevant evidence in the action against both. On the award of damages and attorney's fees: The Court agreed that the award of exemplary damages was improper because no such damages were imposed on the driver, and the master, as a subsidiarily liable party, cannot incur greater civil liability than his convicted employee. However, the Court found no error in the award of attorney's fees. It reasoned that the appellant should have known that his driver might not be able to pay the indemnity, and Article 2208, paragraph 9, authorizes the award of counsel's fees in a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime. Considering the appeal, the Court doubled the award for attorney's fees.
Main Doctrine
The master's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for crimes committed by his employee in the discharge of their duties is not predicated upon the insolvency of the employee. Insolvency is only required for the enforcement of the judgment against the master by execution levy, not for the rendition of judgment against him. Furthermore, a master, as a subsidiarily liable party, cannot incur a greater civil liability than his convicted employee.