Mercado v. Domingo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involves a civil case filed by Victorio Mercado, et al. (plaintiffs) against Florencio Gagui, et al. (defendants). The plaintiffs sought to rescind a contract of barter, be declared owners of specific lots, oust the Gagui defendants from these lots, and annul a lease agreement with the Bongco defendants. The defendants, represented by Atty. Rufino F. Navarro, initially filed motions to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action, lack of jurisdiction, and prescription, which were denied by the trial court. 2. Procedural History: Following the denial of their motions to dismiss, the defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. Consequently, the trial court declared Eduardo and Natividad Bongco in default on November 5, 1959. A subsequent motion by the Bongcos to set aside the default order was denied on December 21, 1959. On January 19, 1960, the remaining defendants, Florencio Gagui, Fermina Gagui, and Bernardo Magpayo, were also declared in default for non-appearance, and the case proceeded ex-parte, resulting in a decision in favor of the plaintiffs on January 30, 1960. The defendants learned of this decision on February 29, 1960. They filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial on March 29, 1960, alleging excusable negligence due to a misplaced court order, which was denied on April 6, 1960. Subsequently, on May 7, 1960, the defendants filed a petition for relief from the judgment. The trial court granted this petition on September 2, 1960, vacating the judgment and admitting the defendants' answer. The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on December 9, 1960. A petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals was dismissed on October 10, 1961, for raising questions of law not in aid of appellate jurisdiction. 3. The Petition: The instant petition for certiorari was filed by the Mercados and Bongcos on February 17, 1962, seeking to annul the trial court's order dated September 2, 1960, which granted the defendants' petition for relief. The petitioners argue that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because the petition for relief was filed out of time, specifically more than sixty days after the defendants learned of the judgment. The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in deducting the period during which a motion for reconsideration was pending from the sixty-day limit prescribed by Rule 38, asserting that these periods are mandatory and non-extendible. Furthermore, they argue that the alleged ground for excusable negligence—a misplaced court order by a brother-in-law—is not credible and does not constitute excusable neglect.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief despite its late filing. Whether the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or new trial suspends the sixty-day period for filing a petition for relief under Rule 38.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The orders granting the petition for relief and vacating the judgment are set aside and declared null and void. The judgment of January 30, 1960, is declared final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief despite its late filing: The Supreme Court held that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion. The Court clarified that under Section 3 of old Rule 38, a petition for relief could be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or order was entered. This language is broad enough to allow a party to seek relief from an order of default as soon as they learn of it, without waiting for the finality of the judgment on the merits. The defendants learned of the decision on February 29, 1960. The petition for relief was filed on May 7, 1960, which was more than sixty days after they learned of the judgment. Therefore, the petition was filed out of time. On whether the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or new trial suspends the sixty-day period for filing a petition for relief under Rule 38: The Court ruled that the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or new trial does not suspend the sixty-day period provided for in Rule 38. It was error for the trial court to subtract the period during which the motion for reconsideration was pending from the sixty-day limit. The periods fixed by Rule 38 are mandatory and non-extendible, and are not subject to any condition or contingency. While a motion for reconsideration suspends the period for the finality of the judgment, it does not suspend the sixty-day period for filing a petition for relief. The defendants had the opportunity to file a petition for relief within the sixty-day period from notice of the judgment, but they neglected this opportunity. The Court also found the ground alleged for relief, that the counsel's brother-in-law misplaced the mail, to be incredible and not constitutive of excusable negligence.
Main Doctrine
The sixty-day period for filing a petition for relief under Rule 38 is mandatory and non-extendible, and is not suspended by the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or new trial filed under Rule 37. A petition for relief may be filed as soon as the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or proceeding to be set aside, without waiting for the finality of the judgment on the merits.