Eleazar v. Auditor General
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Procopio F. Eleazar, formerly Manager of the Industrial Department of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (later Development Bank of the Philippines), was suspended from his position due to his involvement in Criminal Case No. 36042 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. This criminal case stemmed from an anomaly concerning a P1,000,000.00 loan granted to Villanueva Steamship Co., Inc. 2. Procedural History: Eleazar was reinstated in March 1961, without prejudice to ongoing administrative proceedings. Subsequently, the Board of Governors, acting on a committee's recommendation, issued Resolution No. 4505 on June 28, 1962. This resolution reprimanded Eleazar instead of imposing a two-month suspension, ordered payment of his salaries during the suspension period, and increased his retirement salary. However, the resolution did not explicitly authorize payment of other emoluments like bonuses, cost of living allowances, and gift certificates. The office auditor disallowed these emoluments totaling P13,055.41. Eleazar's requests for authorization and reconsideration of this denial were rejected by the Board. The matter was then referred to the Auditor General, who also denied the claim. 3. The Petition: Eleazar appealed the Auditor General's decision to the Supreme Court under Section 1, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. He argued for the payment of disallowed emoluments amounting to P13,055.41, invoking principles of justice and equity. The Supreme Court, however, found no valid reason to interfere with the Auditor General's discretion, noting that the Board's resolution only authorized salaries and not other emoluments, and that the grant of such benefits was a privilege, not a right, subject to the Board's determination in the best interest of the Bank.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner is entitled to payment of emoluments such as bonus, cost of living allowances, and gift certificates corresponding to the period of his suspension, despite the absence of explicit authorization in the Board's resolution.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Auditor General. The Court found no valid reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Auditor General, who denied the petitioner's claim for emoluments.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Board of Governors' Resolution No. 4505 dated June 28, 1962, merely provided for the payment of the petitioner's salaries corresponding to the period of his suspension. It did not explicitly authorize the payment of other emoluments such as bonus, living allowances, and gift certificates. The Court emphasized that the grant of such emoluments is not a matter of right but a mere privilege which the Board may or may not allow, considering the circumstances of each case. The Board's subsequent resolutions (Nos. 423 and 1574) denying reconsideration further indicated their stance. The Auditor General's ruling was based not only on the disallowance by the bank's auditor but also on these Board resolutions, which were presumed to have been adopted in the best interest of the Bank. Under Republic Act No. 85, as amended, the Board of Governors is invested with the exclusive power to determine the propriety of such grants. Therefore, the Court found no reason to disturb the Auditor General's decision.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General denying the petitioner's claim for additional emoluments (bonus, cost of living allowances, and gift certificates) amounting to P13,055.41 during his suspension. The Court held that the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of the Philippines, in its resolution authorizing payment of salaries during suspension, did not explicitly grant these additional emoluments. Since the grant of such emoluments is a privilege, not a right, and is within the discretion of the Board, the Auditor General's denial, based on the Board's subsequent resolutions and the auditor's disallowance, was upheld as it did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion.