Chan v. Commissioner of Immigration

G.R. No. L-21732 · 1966-10-17 · J. BENGZON, J.P., J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil, Immigration
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: So Ming Lee, a Portuguese national, entered the Philippines as a temporary visitor. She married Santos Chan, a Filipino citizen, during her authorized stay. Subsequently, she petitioned the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien registration and allow her permanent residency, asserting Filipino citizenship through marriage. The Commissioner denied her request for an extension of stay and ordered the forfeiture of her P1,000 cash bond posted by Ambrosio Cabo Cheng, finding her marriage to Chan invalid due to both parties having prior existing marriages, thus precluding her from acquiring Filipino citizenship. The Commissioner then ordered So Ming Lee to depart within three days. 2. Procedural History: So Ming Lee, Santos Chan, and Ambrosio Cabo Cheng filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Manila. They sought to annul the Commissioner's order denying So Ming Lee's petition for cancellation of her alien certificate of registration and the confiscation of the bond, to declare So Ming Lee a Filipino citizen, to secure a refund of the bond, and to prevent her arrest and deportation. The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the petition was premature and lacked cause of action, as deportation proceedings had not concluded. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition, deeming it premature and stating that the proper remedy was habeas corpus, as the Board of Immigration Commissioners had not yet decided on So Ming Lee's right to stay. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court due to purely legal questions. 3. The Petition: The petitioners-appellants are before the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal of their petition by the Court of First Instance. They argue that the lower court erred in acting upon a motion to dismiss after ordering the respondent to answer and contend that their petition should have been treated as one for declaratory relief. The core of their argument revolves around So Ming Lee's alleged Filipino citizenship acquired through marriage, which they believe exempts her from deportation and warrants the cancellation of her alien registration and the return of the posted bond. They also contest the confiscation of the bond while her petition was still pending.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in acting upon the motion to dismiss and ruling that the petition was premature. Whether the petition should be considered as also for declaratory relief. Whether an alien woman marrying a Filipino citizen automatically acquires Filipino citizenship. Whether the Commissioner of Immigration may conduct preliminary proceedings to determine the validity of a marriage for deportation purposes. Whether the bond posted for an alien may be confiscated upon failure to depart.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, with costs against the appellants. The Court held that the trial court did not err in entertaining the motion to dismiss and that the petition was indeed premature. The Court also ruled that the petition could not be considered as one for declaratory relief in this context. The Court reiterated that an alien woman marrying a Filipino citizen does not automatically become a Filipino citizen and must still prove her qualifications. The Commissioner has the authority to conduct preliminary proceedings to determine the validity of a marriage for deportation purposes. The forfeiture of the bond was upheld as the condition of the bond was violated.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of the trial court entertaining the motion to dismiss and the prematurity of the petition: The Court held that the rule allowing a motion to dismiss before filing an answer, applicable to ordinary actions, can be applied to special civil actions like certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, provided there is no inconsistency. The Court cited Arvisu vs. Vergara to support the principle that dismissal is proper if, before an answer is filed, the petition appears to be without merit from its own allegations. The Court found that the petition was premature because the issue of So Ming Lee's citizenship and right to stay had not yet been fully determined by the Board of Commissioners, and deportation proceedings had not been terminated, making judicial interference inappropriate at that stage. The Court emphasized that the proper remedy for an alien unlawfully detained is habeas corpus, not certiorari to prevent deportation proceedings. On the issue of whether the petition should be considered for declaratory relief: The Court ruled that declaratory relief is discretionary and may be refused if not necessary or proper under the circumstances. In this case, the Court found that the proper forum to resolve the dispute was the Board of Commissioners, not a court through an action for declaratory relief, thus declining to entertain it as such. On the issue of an alien woman marrying a Filipino citizen acquiring Filipino citizenship: The Court reiterated its long-standing pronouncement that an alien woman marrying a Filipino citizen does not, by that fact alone, become a Filipino. She must still possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law. The Court stressed that if this were not the case, Philippine laws could be easily circumvented by aliens marrying Filipino citizens. Therefore, So Ming Lee's marriage to Santos Chan did not automatically confer Filipino citizenship upon her. On the issue of the Commissioner's authority to conduct preliminary proceedings and pass upon the validity of the marriage: The Court affirmed that for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists against an alien to warrant deportation, the Commissioner of Immigration may conduct preliminary proceedings and pass upon the validity of the marriage on which the question of her nationality depends. This is a necessary step in the process of determining deportability. The Court clarified that it is not correct to assert that the question of citizenship should be determined exclusively by the courts, especially in the preliminary stages of deportation proceedings. On the issue of bond forfeiture: The Court held that the bond posted to ensure an alien's departure after the expiration of their stay may be confiscated upon failure to produce the alien when ordered by the Commissioner, as the condition of the bond has been violated. The Court stated that a bondsman seeking a refund due to the alien's marriage to a Filipino husband, without proof that the alien herself may be naturalized, does not sufficiently show cause for the bond's release. The burden of proving a change in political status from alien to citizen rests on the alien, and this proof should first be presented before the Board of Commissioners.

Main Doctrine

The Court of First Instance may entertain a motion to dismiss a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before filing an answer, and may dismiss the petition if it appears to be without merit from its own allegations. Furthermore, issues regarding an alien's citizenship and right to stay, particularly when predicated on marriage to a Filipino citizen, must first be threshed out before the Board of Commissioners, and courts generally cannot interfere prematurely, especially when deportation proceedings are pending.

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