Paragas v. Bernal
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Zoilo C. Paragas was designated Acting Chief of Police of Dagupan City on July 26, 1961, took his oath on September 6, 1961, and was later appointed ad interim Chief of Police on November 6, 1961. This ad interim appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 3, 1962. However, on September 11, 1962, the Assistant Executive Secretary, acting for the President, informed Paragas to cease performing his duties. The reason given was that his designation as acting chief had expired on May 17, 1962, with the adjournment of Congress, and his ad interim appointment was rendered ineffective by Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal, dated December 31, 1961, which nullified ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961. Consequently, the City Mayor, Treasurer, and Auditor of Dagupan City refused to recognize Paragas as Chief of Police. Procedural History: Following the directive to cease performing his duties, Paragas initiated a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. He filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Assistant Executive Secretary's letter and to compel the city officials to continue paying his salary. The lower court granted the preliminary injunction upon the posting of a P1,000.00 bond. Subsequently, after a hearing, the Court of First Instance dismissed Paragas's petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction, ordering him to pay costs. A motion for reconsideration was denied, leading Paragas to file the present appeal. The Petition: Paragas appeals the decision of the lower court, arguing that the court erred in upholding the President's action directing him to desist from performing his duties. While the lower court acknowledged that Paragas's ad interim appointment was confirmed and should have made him a permanent Chief of Police, it ruled that Section 19 of Republic Act No. 170, as amended, allowed the President to remove the Chief of Police of Dagupan City at pleasure. Paragas contends that this section was repealed by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2259 and Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959), citing the case of Libarnes vs. Executive Secretary. He seeks to overturn the lower court's ruling and reinstate his position.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 19 of Republic Act No. 170, as amended, was repealed by Republic Act No. 2259 and Republic Act No. 2260. Whether the President's directive for the petitioner to desist from performing his duties constituted a removal from office or an expiration of his term.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, dismissing the petition and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that the petitioner's term as Chief of Police expired upon receipt of the directive from the President's office, as the incumbent holds office at the pleasure of the President under the city's charter.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Section 19 of Republic Act No. 170, as amended, was repealed by Republic Act No. 2259 and Republic Act No. 2260: The Court distinguished the present case from Libarnes vs. Executive Secretary. In Libarnes, the termination was based on a statute explicitly allowing removal "at pleasure," which was found inconsistent with subsequent laws requiring cause for removal. In this case, the Court found that Section 19 of Republic Act No. 170, as amended, which states the incumbent "shall" hold office "at the pleasure of the President," was not repealed by the cited subsequent laws. The Court emphasized that the Libarnes ruling was specific to the statute involved therein and did not establish a general rule that all "at pleasure" provisions were repealed. Therefore, the provision allowing the President to terminate the services of the Chief of Police at his pleasure remained valid. On whether the President's directive constituted a removal from office or an expiration of term: The Court held that the directive from the President's office did not constitute a "removal" from office. It reasoned that "removal" implies the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of their term, which requires cause under certain laws. In contrast, the Chief of Police of Dagupan City, under the city's charter (Republic Act No. 170, as amended), "holds office at the pleasure of the President." Consequently, the term of office of the Chief of Police expires whenever the President declares it to be so. The communication received by the petitioner was interpreted as an act of the President declaring the expiration of the petitioner's term, not an act of removal. Thus, the action taken was within the President's prerogative under the law.
Main Doctrine
The Chief of Police of Dagupan City, under Republic Act No. 170, as amended, holds office at the pleasure of the President, and the President's directive for the incumbent to desist from performing duties constitutes an expiration of term, not a removal from office. This is distinct from removal which requires cause under subsequent legislation.