Riego v. Riego
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Remegia Riego and Agapito Revillosa, filed a complaint for the exercise of the right of pre-emption over two parcels of land. These lands were part of the inheritance of Remegia Riego from her deceased father and were assigned to her brother, defendant Pablo Riego, in an extrajudicial partition. The partition deed contained a stipulation granting heirs the right of pre-emption over inherited property assigned to a co-heir and sold to third parties. Pablo Riego sold one parcel to co-defendant Catalina Padolina without informing the plaintiffs. Procedural History: Defendants Rabe and Padolina moved for dismissal, arguing that the complaint stated no cause of action because plaintiffs had not received written notice of the sale as required by Article 1623 of the New Civil Code, and that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations as plaintiffs learned of the sale in December 1960 but did not exercise their right within thirty days. The trial court dismissed the complaint on November 28, 1962. A copy of the dismissal order was served by mail on plaintiff Agapito Revillosa on December 6, 1962. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on June 26, 1963, which was opposed as being out of time. The court denied the motion on August 24, 1963, on the ground of lateness. The Petition: Plaintiffs appealed the order denying their motion for reconsideration, raising the issue of whether service of the order of dismissal upon one of the plaintiffs, instead of their attorney of record, was sufficient to commence the thirty-day period for appeal or motion for reconsideration.
Issue(s)
Whether the service of the order of dismissal upon the plaintiff himself, instead of his attorney of record, was valid for the purpose of computing the thirty-day period to move for reconsideration or appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court denying the motion for reconsideration, holding that the service of the order of dismissal upon the plaintiffs was valid, and consequently, their motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that while the general rule under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court requires service upon the attorney of record, the rule expressly allows for an exception when 'service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.' In this case, the trial court had specifically instructed the Clerk of Court to notify the plaintiffs directly because the whereabouts of their counsel, Atty. Ortañes de Guia, could not be ascertained by authorities in Marinduque or Manila. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that the same attorney was the subject of an unserved arrest warrant in a criminal case and had failed to appear in other pending civil matters. Applying the ruling in Tanpico v. Lozada, the Court emphasized that when the trial court orders service on the party due to the counsel's unavailability, such service is legally effective. The plaintiffs even demonstrated awareness of the proceedings when one of them appeared at the hearing for the motion to dismiss despite the absence of their counsel. Consequently, the thirty-day period began to run from December 6, 1962, making the motion filed in June 1963 significantly late.
Main Doctrine
Service of court orders and notices upon the attorney of record is mandatory, and service upon the party himself is generally insufficient, unless the court expressly orders otherwise. A motion for reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary period, computed from the date of valid service, shall be denied.