Lagman v. City of Manila
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman, operating as "Marco Transit," was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission to operate fifteen auto trucks on the Bocaue (Bulacan) — Parañaque (Rizal) route, including specific routes within Manila. He began operations with twelve buses. On July 13, 1964, the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4986, regulating provincial passenger buses within the city between 6:30 A.M. and 8:30 P.M. daily, except Sundays and Holidays, and allowing a "flexible shuttle bus service" under specific conditions, prohibiting loading or unloading passengers except at designated points. Procedural History: Petitioner initially filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Supreme Court on August 6, 1964, seeking to declare his rights under the ordinance and praying for injunctions. The Court initially dismissed the petition but later reconsidered, gave due course, and converted it into a petition for prohibition after the ordinance was enforced starting August 17, 1964, restricting petitioner's operations to two shuttle buses. The Court did not issue a preliminary injunction. The Petition: Petitioner contended that Ordinance No. 4986 was unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and void. He argued that the regulation of national roads fell under the Director of Public Works (Commonwealth Act No. 548), not the City of Manila, as the ordinance lacked approval from relevant executive officials. He also claimed the ordinance illegally amended his certificate of public convenience, a power exclusively vested in the Public Service Commission. Furthermore, he asserted the enforcement was arbitrary and oppressive, and that his buses merely "pass thru the city" and should be covered by the saving clause of Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409 (Manila Charter).
Issue(s)
Whether Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila is constitutional, legal, and valid. Whether the City of Manila has the authority to enact an ordinance that effectively amends or modifies a certificate of public convenience granted by the Public Service Commission. Whether the enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable. Whether petitioner's buses, which operate on a route passing through Manila, are covered by the saving clause of Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended.
Ruling
The petition for prohibition is denied. The Supreme Court ruled that Ordinance No. 4986 is valid and its enforcement is lawful.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity and authority of Ordinance No. 4986: The Court held that Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, is a special law and of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Law. Therefore, in case of conflict, Republic Act No. 409 prevails. The power of the City of Manila under Section 18(hh) of its charter to "prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial utility vehicles into the City, except those passing thru the City" is an explicit delegation of police power that is paramount. This power is not exclusive to the Director of Public Works under Commonwealth Act No. 548, and the City's ordinance is deemed an exception to the general provisions of that Act. The Court cited the principle that a special law constitutes an exception to a general law in the absence of contrary circumstances. On the conflict with the Public Service Commission's authority: The Court found no provision in the Public Service Act vesting the Public Service Commission with the power to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of the City of Manila or to suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. While the Commission can amend certificates of public convenience, this power is subordinate to the authority granted to the City under its charter. The Court noted that ordinances regulating bus operations do not encroach upon the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction as long as they do not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation. Furthermore, Section 17(j) of the Public Service Act explicitly empowers the Commission "To require any public service to comply with the laws of the Philippines, and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance relating thereto," indicating that local governments have regulatory power over public services operating within their jurisdiction, and the Commission's role is supplementary. On the charge of arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable enforcement: The Court dismissed this contention for lack of evidence. It noted that the petitioner was not totally banned from operating but was allowed to operate two "shuttle" buses within the city limits, indicating that the ordinance did not impose a complete prohibition. On the applicability of the saving clause: The Court agreed with the respondent that the petitioner could not avail of the saving clause in Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409. The petitioner admitted that his buses engaged in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein. Therefore, his buses did not merely "pass thru the city" but were operating within its business operations, making them subject to the City's regulatory power.
Main Doctrine
The City of Manila, under its charter (Republic Act No. 409, as amended), possesses the paramount police power to regulate and prohibit the entrance of provincial public utility vehicles, which power is superior to the administrative authority of the Director of Public Works under Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Commission under the Public Service Act, provided such regulation does not unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation under its certificate of public convenience.