Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Lucido Garcon was employed as a chief cook by defendant Redemptorist Fathers, a religious corporation, in April 1958. He alleged that the defendant operated a dormitory for students-boarders for profit, and that he was employed without a fixed duration at P200.00 monthly compensation, but was paid only P186.00, leaving a balance of P14.00 monthly. He also claimed he was not paid overtime pay for working 10 hours daily, including Sundays and holidays. On January 14, 1963, he was allegedly summarily dismissed without just cause, notice, or termination pay. He sued for unpaid salaries, overtime pay, termination pay, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Procedural History: Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting it was a religious order operating a minor seminary, not a commercial establishment for profit, and thus not covered by the Termination Pay Law (Republic Act No. 1052, as amended) or the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended). The defendant also argued that the plaintiff, as a cook, was a domestic employee not entitled to overtime pay. The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint, finding the defendant outside the coverage of the cited laws. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal. The Petition: The plaintiff appealed the dismissal, arguing that the trial court erred in resolving the motion to dismiss based on disputed facts and that the complaint, as pleaded, stated a valid cause of action under the Termination Pay Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on a motion to dismiss by considering disputed facts. Whether the plaintiff's complaint stated a valid cause of action under the Termination Pay Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law, given the allegations that the defendant operated a dormitory for profit. Whether the plaintiff, as a cook, is considered a domestic employee not entitled to overtime pay under the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case to the court of origin with directions to overrule the motion to dismiss and proceed in accordance with law. Costs were assessed against the defendant-appellee.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the motion to dismiss: The Court held that the trial court erred in deciding the motion to dismiss based on the truthfulness of the allegations. A motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The test is the sufficiency of these allegations to constitute a cause of action, not whether they are true. The insufficiency must be apparent on the face of the complaint itself. The trial court improperly considered facts not alleged or proved, and improperly injected matters of defense into the determination of the motion to dismiss. On the sufficiency of the cause of action under the Termination Pay Law and Eight-Hour Labor Law: Considering exclusively the allegations in the complaint, the Court found that the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to bring his case within the coverage of both the Termination Pay Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. The allegation that the defendant operated a dormitory for profit or gain, classifying it as a commercial enterprise or engaged in industry or occupation, was deemed sufficient to fall under the purview of these laws. The complaint also averred violations of these laws, for which the plaintiff sought remedies. On the plaintiff's status as a domestic employee and entitlement to overtime pay: Even granting hypothetically that the plaintiff was a domestic employee, the complaint would still state a cause of action under the Civil Code. As a domestic engaged in household service, the plaintiff would be entitled to vacation with pay and to not be dismissed without advance notice, as provided by Articles 1695 and 1698, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, respectively. The complaint alleged services rendered for ten hours daily, including Sundays and holidays, and summary dismissal without just cause and notice, which would support a claim under these provisions.
Main Doctrine
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity, is the test. If the complaint alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief under applicable laws, a cause of action is stated.