Guevara v. Inocentes
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the validity of an ad interim appointment to the position of Undersecretary of Labor. Petitioner Onofre P. Guevara received an ad interim appointment on November 18, 1965, and took his oath on November 25, 1965. Respondent Raoul M. Inocentes was subsequently extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. 2. Procedural History: Petitioner Guevara initiated this action by filing a petition for quo warranto before the Supreme Court. He sought a declaration that he is the legally entitled person to the office of Undersecretary of Labor, challenging the validity of respondent Inocentes' appointment. The Supreme Court, in a resolution dated February 16, 1966, initially resolved that Guevara's ad interim appointment had lapsed upon the adjournment of the special session of Congress on January 22, 1966. This decision elaborates on the reasoning behind that resolution. 3. The Petition: The petition for quo warranto is predicated on the argument that petitioner's ad interim appointment, made by the former Executive, remained valid and permanent under Article VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution. Petitioner contended that the appointment would only become ineffective upon express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or upon the adjournment of the regular session of Congress in 1966. He argued that neither of these conditions had been met, particularly emphasizing that the special session of Congress had not adjourned in the manner contemplated by the Constitution, and the Commission on Appointments had not been constituted. The petition seeks to establish the petitioner's legal entitlement to the office.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner's ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor lapsed upon the adjournment of the special session of Congress. Whether the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" in Article VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution refers only to the adjournment of a regular session or includes the adjournment of a special session. Whether the adjournment of Congress, without the Commission on Appointments having been constituted or having acted on the appointment, terminates the effectivity of an ad interim appointment.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The ad interim appointment extended to petitioner lapsed when the special session of Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the petitioner's ad interim appointment lapsed upon the adjournment of the special session of Congress: The Court held that the ad interim appointment extended to petitioner lapsed when the special session of Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966. This conclusion is based on the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution as expressed in Article VII, Section 10(4), which states that such appointments are effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The Court emphasized that these two modes of termination are separate and independent of each other. The adjournment of Congress, whether regular or special, has the constitutional effect of terminating the ad interim appointment, rendering it legally ineffective. The Court rejected the petitioner's theory that the adjournment clause is dependent on the constitution of the Commission on Appointments, as this would lead to an anomaly where appointments could remain permanent if the Commission is never organized. On whether "the next adjournment of the Congress" refers only to a regular session: The Court ruled that the constitutional provision does not distinguish between a regular or special session when referring to "adjournment." Applying the maxim "ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus" (where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish), the Court concluded that the framers intended "adjournment" to encompass either a regular or a special session. The petitioner's contention that it must refer to a regular session was deemed an attempt to judicially legislate by inserting the word "regular" into the Constitution, which the Court cannot do. The plain language of the provision is unambiguous and must be given effect according to its obvious meaning. On whether the adjournment of Congress terminates the effectivity of an ad interim appointment without action from the Commission on Appointments: The Court affirmed that the adjournment of Congress terminates the effectivity of an ad interim appointment irrespective of whether the Commission on Appointments was constituted or had acted upon it. The two modes of termination are independent. The power to appoint is executive, while the power to confirm or reject is legislative, exercised through the Commission on Appointments. When Congress adjourns without organizing the Commission, it is deemed to have implicitly exercised its power to check by allowing the ad interim appointments to lapse as provided by the Constitution. The adjournment itself serves as a constitutional mechanism to end the effectiveness of such appointments, allowing the President to make new appointments upon the resumption of sessions.
Main Doctrine
An ad interim appointment made during a recess of Congress becomes ineffective upon the next adjournment of Congress, regardless of whether the Commission on Appointments was constituted or had acted upon the appointment.