Javellana v. Querubin
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involves a civil case, Civil Case No. 7350, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch II, where a decision was rendered against petitioner Roque Javellana. 2. Procedural History: Following the decision against him, petitioner Javellana filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Before the appeal was perfected, the prevailing party, VMC Sugar Planter's Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., moved for and was granted execution pending appeal by the respondent court on May 28, 1966. This was based on the court's finding that Javellana's repeated requests for continuances indicated an intent to delay the termination of the case. Javellana's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 9, 1966. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Roque Javellana seeks a writ of certiorari to annul the orders of the respondent court granting execution pending appeal. He argues that the inference of intent to delay, based on continuances, is insufficient to justify immediate execution, and that the lower court should not have granted the continuances if they were indeed dilatory. He also contends that the factual circumstances differ from prior cases where execution pending appeal was set aside. Furthermore, he asserts that certiorari is not the proper remedy as he could have stayed execution by posting a supersedeas bond.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment pending appeal. Whether the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law to prevent the execution pending appeal.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The writ of certiorari prayed for is denied, with costs against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment pending appeal: The Court held that the finding that an appeal is being taken for purposes of delay is a good and sufficient reason for issuing a writ of execution pending appeal. The Court reiterated that dilatory tactics constitute a great drawback to the administration of justice and cannot be countenanced. While the intention to delay is not susceptible of direct proof, it can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. In this case, the Court found that the numerous continuances sought by the petitioner amply supported the inference of intent to delay. The argument that the court should not have granted the continuances if they were dilatory was dismissed, acknowledging that trial courts handle many cases and the intent to delay may only become apparent upon an overall review of the proceedings. The Court also noted that with the resources available under the Revised Rules for pre-trials, requests for admissions, discovery, interrogatories, and depositions, there is less reason to delay trials for evidence preparation. On Whether the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law to prevent the execution pending appeal: The Court stated that certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, cannot be resorted to when another adequate remedy is available. In this case, the petitioner, as the would-be appellant, could have stayed the execution by tendering a supersedeas bond, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. This would have enabled the trial court to stay execution, without prejudice to attacking the issuance of the execution in his brief on appeal. Having failed to avail himself of this remedy, the petitioner was not entitled to certiorari.
Main Doctrine
The finding that an appeal is being taken for purposes of delay is a good and sufficient reason for issuing a writ of execution pending appeal, and failure to avail of the remedy of a supersedeas bond precludes resort to certiorari.