Development Bank v. Santos
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involves an action initiated by the Development Bank of the Philippines against Spouses Adriano V. Santos and Martina Habacon, and Evaristo Picazo. The specific nature of the dispute or the claims made by the Development Bank of the Philippines are not detailed in the provided text, beyond the fact that the case was dismissed against appellee Evaristo Picazo. 2. Procedural History: The Development Bank of the Philippines (appellant) filed an appeal after the trial court dismissed the case against appellee Evaristo Picazo via an order dated February 11, 1966. The appellant's counsel received this order on March 16, 1966. A motion for reconsideration was filed on March 23, 1966, which was subsequently denied by an order dated April 11, 1966. The appellant then filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond on April 20, 1966, followed by an urgent motion for an extension of time to file the record on appeal on April 25, 1966. The appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. 3. The Petition: The appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal is based on the sole ground that the record on appeal fails to demonstrate on its face that the appeal was perfected within the period prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court, specifically citing Rule 50(a) in conjunction with Rule 56(1) and Rule 41(6). The appellee contends that the record on appeal does not disclose the date the appellant received notice of the order denying its motion for reconsideration, making it impossible to ascertain the timeliness of the appeal. The appellant argues that the appeal was timely filed on May 12, 1966, as per an extended period granted by the lower court, and attributes the omission to the record preparation date and subsequent correction through failure to object to the record's approval.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal was perfected on time. Whether the record on appeal sufficiently shows on its face that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The appeal is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the appeal was perfected on time: The Court held that the record on appeal must contain sufficient data to show on its face that the appeal was perfected on time. In this case, while the order of dismissal, the motion for reconsideration, and the order denying the motion for reconsideration were included, the date of receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration was not disclosed in the record on appeal. This omission is critical because it prevents the determination of whether the appeal was filed within the reglementary period, especially after considering the period during which the motion for reconsideration was pending. The appellant's claim that an extension was granted and that the order was not yet served when the record was prepared does not cure the defect in the record itself. The record on appeal must speak for itself regarding the timeliness of the appeal. On Whether the record on appeal sufficiently shows on its face that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period: The Court found that the record on appeal failed to satisfy the mandatory requirement of Rule 41, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court. This rule mandates that the record on appeal shall include "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time." The absence of the date of receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration is a fatal deficiency. The certification of the record on appeal by the trial court after the period to appeal has expired cannot restore lost jurisdiction. The principle is confirmed by Rule 50, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Court, which provides for the dismissal of appeals not perfected in accordance with the rules. Therefore, the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction over the appealed case due to the failure to perfect the appeal on time as shown by the record on appeal.
Main Doctrine
The record on appeal must contain sufficient data to show on its face that the appeal was perfected on time. Failure to include the date of receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration is a fatal defect that deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.