Ocampo v. Caluag
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioner Miguel Ocampo filed a complaint for damages against respondent Dr. Gregorio Venturanza in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-6042. Respondent Venturanza filed an answer with a counterclaim, and petitioner Ocampo replied to the counterclaim. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on February 19, 1962. 2. Procedural History: On the scheduled hearing date, neither respondent Venturanza nor his counsel appeared. The trial court allowed petitioner Ocampo to present his evidence ex parte. On March 19, 1962, the court rendered judgment in favor of Ocampo. Respondent Venturanza's counsel received the decision on March 27, 1962. After the period for reconsideration or appeal expired, petitioner Ocampo moved for execution. On July 10, 1962, the trial court denied Venturanza's motion for reconsideration and relief from judgment and granted Ocampo's motion for execution. Subsequently, Venturanza filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel, a motion to set aside the execution order, and a notice of appeal. On August 1, 1962, the respondent judge motu proprio set aside the decision of March 19, 1962, and reset the case for hearing on the merits. This order was formalized in writing on November 12, 1962. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Miguel Ocampo filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeking to nullify the respondent judge's order of November 12, 1962, which set aside the March 19, 1962 decision and reopened the case. The core issue is whether the respondent judge had the jurisdiction to set aside a final and executory decision. Petitioner argues that the decision had become final and executory as no timely motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed, and the grounds presented for relief did not constitute excusable negligence. Petitioner seeks an order directing the respondent judge to issue a writ of execution for the March 19, 1962 decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge had the power or jurisdiction to set aside his decision dated March 19, 1962, after it had become final and executory. Whether the ground of excusable negligence invoked by respondent Venturanza's counsel was sufficient to warrant relief from the judgment.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The order of the respondent Judge dated November 12, 1962, is revoked and set aside. The respondent Judge is ordered to desist from reopening the case and to issue the writ of execution for the decision dated March 19, 1962. Costs against respondent Venturanza.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the respondent judge's power to set aside the decision: The Supreme Court held that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside the decision of March 19, 1962. A copy of the decision was received by respondent Venturanza's counsel on March 27, 1962, giving them until April 26, 1962, to file a motion for reconsideration or perfect an appeal. Since no such motion or appeal was filed within the reglementary period, the decision became final and executory as a matter of course. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power and jurisdiction of the trial court to alter, amend, or revoke it; the only power retained is to order its execution. This principle is well-established in jurisprudence, citing cases like Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson and Viquiera vs. Baraña. On the issue of excusable negligence: The Court found that the ground of excusable negligence invoked by respondent Venturanza's counsel was insufficient. The explanation that the receiving clerk forgot about the notice of hearing due to illness was deemed a "hackneyed and habitual subterfuge" and not constitutive of excusable negligence, citing previous rulings of the Supreme Court in cases such as Philippine Air Lines vs. Hon. Francisco Arca, et al. and Gaerlan vs. Bernal. The Court emphasized that clients are bound by the errors and negligence of their attorneys, citing Montes vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and other cases, and that accepting such common excuses would be a whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
A trial court loses jurisdiction to alter or amend a decision once it has become final and executory, except for the sole power to order its execution. A claim of excusable negligence based on a receiving clerk forgetting about a notice of hearing due to illness is generally not considered excusable negligence, especially when it becomes a habitual subterfuge.