Velayo v. Velayo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a suit filed by Consuelo Velayo against her husband, Rodolfo Velayo, seeking separation of conjugal properties and support for their three minor children. The Court of First Instance found that the defendant had abandoned his wife for at least a year and initially allowed the petition for separation of properties, ordering the parties to submit an agreement. Procedural History: The parties submitted a compromise agreement, which was approved by the Court of First Instance on May 30, 1953, detailing the division of properties and provisions for support. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. An order for the defendant to pay approximately P28,000.00 was issued on January 8, 1958, from which the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, posting a supersedeas bond. During this appeal, the parties entered into a new agreement on July 2, 1958. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case based on this new agreement. This dismissal was appealed to the Supreme Court (L-14541), which held the new agreement valid in part, but found that it did not cover the plaintiff's share in the conjugal properties, leaving P15,000.00 payable. The case was remanded, and subsequent motions regarding the cancellation of the supersedeas bond were made, with the lower court eventually ordering its cancellation on June 22, 1964, citing the lapse of the five-year period for execution. The Petition: The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court from the order cancelling the supersedeas bond. The core legal question presented is whether the supersedeas bond remains answerable for amounts due under the judgment. The plaintiff argues that the judgment for support, particularly the P200.00 monthly for her support, remains enforceable as future support could not be waived and the five-year period for execution does not apply to support judgments, which are enforceable by motion at any time.
Issue(s)
Whether the supersedeas bond remains answerable for amounts due under the judgment, considering the cancellation order based on the lapse of the five-year period for execution by motion. Whether a judgment for support becomes dormant and subject to the five-year period for execution by motion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the appealed order cancelling the defendant's supersedeas bond.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the supersedeas bond remains answerable: The Court held that the supersedeas bond, which was posted to secure the fulfillment and payment of the judgment appealed, remains answerable for amounts due under the judgment. The bond's undertaking explicitly covers situations where the judgment becomes effective due to appeal withdrawal, dismissal, or improper allowance. The cancellation order was based on the erroneous premise that the judgment could no longer be executed by motion due to the lapse of the five-year period. Since the judgment for support is not dormant and remains enforceable, the bond continues to serve its purpose as security. On the issue of whether a judgment for support becomes dormant: The Court reiterated that a judgment for support does not become dormant. The five-year period for execution by motion, as provided in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, does not apply to judgments for support. Instead, support installments become due from time to time as provided in the judgment and are enforceable by simple motion at any time, subject only to the statute of limitations for recovery of installments not yet collected. This principle ensures that the obligation to support is continuously enforceable as it accrues.
Main Doctrine
A judgment for support does not become dormant; the five-year period for execution by motion does not apply thereto. Support under such a judgment becomes due from time to time and is enforceable by simple motion at any time, except as to installments not recovered within the statute of limitations.