King v. Joe
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involved a civil case where the City Court of Manila ordered defendants to pay the plaintiff P4,410.00 with 14% interest per annum from October 28, 1963, until fully paid, plus P500.00 as attorneys' fees and costs. Procedural History: Defendants were notified of the judgment on March 16, 1964. On March 30, 1964, they filed a motion for an extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which the City Court denied on April 6, 1964, deeming it filed purely for delay. Defendants received this denial order on April 20, 1964, and subsequently filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and paid the appellate docket fee on April 21, 1964. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal in the Court of First Instance, arguing it was filed 21 days late. The Court of First Instance granted this motion on June 18, 1964, dismissing the appeal. The Petition: The defendants, thwarted in their attempt to have the dismissal reconsidered, have appealed this order of dismissal to the Supreme Court. Their appeal hinges on the argument that their appeal to the Court of First Instance was perfected within the reglementary period, despite the City Court's denial of their motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration, which they contend should have tolled the appeal period.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal perfected by the defendants from the City Court to the Court of First Instance was filed out of time. Whether a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration tolls the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the defendants' appeal. The appeal was perfected out of time.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the appeal was filed out of time: The law grants a defeated party in an inferior court 15 days from notice of judgment within which to appeal to the Court of First Instance. In this case, the defendants were notified on March 16, 1964, meaning the 15-day period expired on March 31, 1964. The defendants filed their appeal only on April 21, 1964, which was long after the reglementary period had elapsed. Therefore, the appeal was indeed perfected out of time. On whether a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration tolls the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal: The Supreme Court held that such a motion does not toll the reglementary period. The defendants filed their motion for extension on March 30, 1964, 14 days after notice of the decision and only one day before the appeal period would have expired. The City Court correctly denied this motion as being "purely for delay." The Court reiterated the established jurisprudence that a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, unlike a motion for new trial, does not interrupt the period for perfecting an appeal. If even a pro-forma motion for reconsideration or new trial does not stop the running of the period, a motion merely for extension, especially one for delay, is similarly without merit. The filing of such a motion does not suspend the running of the period sought to be extended, as it would create an absurdity if the mere filing of a petition for extension could ipso facto extend the time. The defendants took for granted the court's approval of their motion at their own risk, and since the motion was denied and the appeal period had expired, they had nobody to blame.
Main Doctrine
A motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, especially one filed purely for delay, does not toll the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal. The appeal must be perfected within the statutory period, and failure to do so results in its dismissal.