Carillo v. de la Victoria
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Matias S. Carillo (petitioner) was appointed Chief of Police of Matanao, Davao, effective July 8, 1957, and again effective July 8, 1958, with the latter appointment being "subject to the provision of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1551." Petitioner sought reinstatement after being replaced by Cornelio de la Rey, appointed Acting Chief of Police. Petitioner claimed his initial appointment was validated by the municipal council's approval of the plantilla of personnel for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, which included his name. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Davao dismissed Carillo's complaint, holding that his appointment lacked the essential element of municipal council approval. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The Petition: Carillo filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the approval of the plantilla constituted sufficient council consent and that his civil service eligibility guaranteed his security of tenure.
Issue(s)
Whether the approval of the plantilla of personnel by the municipal council constitutes sufficient consent to the appointment of a Chief of Police under Section 1, Republic Act No. 1551. Whether an appointee to the position of Chief of Police, who holds civil service eligibility, is protected by the security of tenure despite accepting a conditional appointment that was not fully complied with. Whether the attestation by the Civil Service Commissioner can substitute for the required municipal council consent for the validity of an appointment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that petitioner Carillo did not possess a valid right to the office of Chief of Police.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of municipal council consent: The Court held that the approval of the plantilla of personnel does not constitute the express consent required by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1551 for the appointment of a Chief of Police. The law mandates that the consent must be explicit and appear on the appointment itself. The purpose of requiring council approval is to ensure that appointments to the police force are based on integrity, honesty, and competence, as judged by both the mayor and the legislative body of the municipality. Therefore, the petitioner's assertion of substantial compliance was without legal basis. On the issue of security of tenure and conditional appointment: The Court ruled that petitioner Carillo's second appointment, effective July 8, 1958, was expressly made "subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1551." Since the required municipal council consent was not obtained, this appointment remained temporary. An individual holding a temporary appointment does not possess a fixed tenure of office and their employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, even if they possess civil service eligibility. The security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution does not apply to temporary appointments where the stipulated conditions for a permanent appointment have not been met. On the issue of Civil Service Commissioner's attestation: The Court clarified that the attestation by the Civil Service Commissioner merely verifies compliance with civil service law and eligibility requirements. It does not, and cannot, substitute for the municipal council's consent, which is a distinct requirement for the validity of the appointment itself. The purpose of the Civil Service Commissioner's attestation is different from the purpose of the municipal council's approval. Therefore, the alleged approval by the Civil Service Commissioner could not validate an incomplete appointment.
Main Doctrine
An appointment to the position of Chief of Police requires the express consent of the municipal council, which must appear on the appointment itself. A mere approval of the plantilla of personnel does not constitute such consent. An appointment made subject to this condition, without the council's consent, is considered temporary and can be terminated at pleasure, irrespective of the appointee's civil service eligibility.