Palanca Tanguinlay v. Quiros
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In 1893, defendant Quiros initiated an action against plaintiff Palanca Tanguinlay, securing an attachment on Palanca Tanguinlay's property, including promissory notes, money, hemp, coprax, merchandise, and furniture. Defendant Jose Reyes Tolentino was appointed official depository of the attached property. In January 1894, a second attachment was levied by Germann and Co. on the same property. The first attachment was dissolved in November 1897, and the second lapsed. In 1904, a new attachment by Germann and Co. led to the sale of remaining hemp and coprax for P838. The official depository, Reyes, never took possession, allowing the goods to remain with Quiros. In 1898, the merchandise was removed from Quiros' house by Mr. Andrea, the Belgian consul, under circumstances not precisely shown, and Quiros did not oppose the removal. Procedural History: This action was brought for the restitution of the attached property or, in default, for P18,000, its value. Among the defenses pleaded was res judicata, based on a prior judgment of the Supreme Court (March 3, 1906) which modified a Court of First Instance ruling on a counterclaim by Palanca Tanguinlay against Quiros for the purchase price of goods. In that counterclaim, Palanca Tanguinlay claimed damages and loss of profits amounting to P20,000 and P40,000, respectively, due to the improper attachment, including compensation for the loss of the same property now sued for. The Court of First Instance awarded P6,347 for damages, but this court reversed that award. The Petition: The present action seeks to recover the attached property or its value, arguing that the prior judgment does not operate as an adjudication upon the matter of the present action.
Issue(s)
Whether the prior judgment in the action between Quiros and Palanca Tanguinlay, wherein Palanca Tanguinlay raised a counterclaim for damages due to the attachment, operates as res judicata barring the present action for the restitution of the attached property or its value. Whether the parties in the two suits were "litigating for the same thing."
Ruling
The Court affirmed the judgment of the court below in favor of the defendants, holding that the prior judgment operates as res judicata and bars the present action.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of res judicata: The Court held that the law of res judicata is well-settled, operating as a bar to a second action upon the same claim not only as to issues actually litigated but also as to all matters which might have been litigated therein. Section 306 of the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment is conclusive between the parties concerning the matter directly adjudged. Section 307 states that only that which appears upon its face to have been adjudged, or was actually and necessarily included therein, is deemed to have been adjudged. The Court noted that these sections were taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure, which has been construed in harmony with the general rule that a judgment is conclusive as to all matters which might have been litigated. The Court cited Bingham vs. Kearney for the principle that a judgment is conclusive not only as to the subject-matter in controversy but also upon all matters involved in the issues which might have been litigated and decided, to prevent piecemeal litigation. The presumption is that all such issues were met and decided in the first action. On whether the parties were "litigating for the same thing": The Court found that even under the narrowest construction of the code, the phrase "litigating for the same thing" suffices to bring the present action within the effect of the former one. The "thing" that must have been deemed to have been adjudged in the former judgment, appearing upon its face, was the conversion of the specific property sued for in the present case. The first judgment determined that Quiros was not liable because no damage was shown to have been suffered by the property while in his possession, and he was not liable thereafter as the property was taken and sold under the attachment of Germann & Co. This reasoning was based on an assumption of fact that all property went into the possession of Germann & Co. and was sold by them. The present action attempts to show this assumption was erroneous by introducing other proofs that existed at the time of the first trial. The Court stated that it is too late for the plaintiff to repair the error by a retrial of the issues already determined. The Court rejected the argument that the cases are different because the first sought damages while the second seeks the property itself, stating that courts are not concerned with the form of action and that the subject-matter and relief sought were regarded as the same. The Court cited Hatch vs. Coddington as an instance where a former action for damages for wrongful conversion barred a subsequent suit for possession of the property. The Court also noted that Spanish law, as commented upon by Señor Manresa, supports the principle of res judicata in such circumstances.
Main Doctrine
A former judgment operates as a bar to a second action upon the same claim, not only as to issues actually litigated but also as to all matters which might have been litigated therein. Even under a narrow construction, the phrase 'litigating for the same thing' suffices to bring a subsequent action within the effect of a former one if the subject matter is the same.