Grafil v. Feliciano

G.R. No. L-27156 · 1967-06-30 · J. CASTRO, J.: · Primary: Commercial; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns overlapping mining claims in barrio Del Pilar, Cabadbaran, Agusan. Manila Mining Corporation filed a protest with the Bureau of Mines on July 9, 1959, alleging that Alfredo B. Grafil's mining claims overlapped 26 of its 147 claims, creating a conflict contrary to section 57 of the Mining Act. Manila Mining sought to restrain Grafil and his men from invading its property. Grafil denied the charge, asserting that Manila Mining had moved its claims to where his were, causing any overlap. LRM Mining Company later intervened, asserting a common interest in the disputed claims. 2. Procedural History: The Bureau of Mines initially ruled in favor of Grafil and LRM Mining, finding no overlap and upholding their right to preference in leasing the area. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed this decision on appeal, finding that 72 of Grafil's claims did overlap Manila Mining's. The Secretary determined that Grafil's location was invalid because the claims were held by another party at the time, while Manila Mining's subsequent location was valid after the prior owner's rights expired. Grafil and LRM Mining then filed a petition for review in the Court of First Instance of Agusan. This petition was dismissed by the court on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decision. A motion for reconsideration of this dismissal was also denied. 3. The Petition: Failing to secure a reconsideration of the dismissal from the Court of First Instance, Grafil and LRM Mining sought to appeal the orders of May 8, 1965, and July 10, 1965. Manila Mining moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was late and the orders had become final. The Court of First Instance denied this motion and forwarded the records to the Supreme Court. Manila Mining reiterated its motion to dismiss the appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the thirty-day period for appeal had expired due to the deemed service of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on August 2, 1965, making the appeal filed on February 28, 1966, untimely. The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the appeal was indeed filed out of time and rejecting the arguments regarding non-receipt of notices and counsel's office transfer as excuses for the delay.

Issue(s)

Whether the appeal filed by the petitioners was timely or if the order of the Court of First Instance had already become final and executory due to the lapse of the reglementary period.

Ruling

The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. The appeal is dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

On the Issue of Timeliness of Appeal: The Court held that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period and thus the order of dismissal had become final. Under the rules, the thirty-day period for appealing the order of May 8, 1965, began to run on May 29, 1965. The filing of a motion for reconsideration on June 9, 1965, suspended the period after eleven days had elapsed, leaving eighteen days remaining. Pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 13, service of the order denying the motion for reconsideration was deemed complete on August 2, 1965—five days after the first postal notice was sent on July 27, 1965. Consequently, the period for appeal expired on August 20, 1965, making the appeal filed on February 28, 1966, nearly six months late. The Court emphasized that the denial of receiving notices cannot overcome the official statement of the postmaster, which carries the legal presumption of regular performance of duty. Furthermore, the transfer of the counsel's office was not a valid excuse as the transfer occurred after the third notice had already been sent to his address of record.

Main Doctrine

The period for appealing from an order denying a motion for reconsideration commences from the date the party is deemed served with notice of the denial, pursuant to the rules on constructive service, and failure to perfect the appeal within the remaining period renders the order final and unappealable.

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