Tanega v. Masakayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Adelaida Tanega was convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City. Upon appeal, the Court of First Instance (CFI) found her guilty and sentenced her to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, and to pay costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, and the Supreme Court declined to review it on certiorari. Procedural History: The CFI of Quezon City directed the execution of the sentence on January 11, 1965, setting it for January 27, 1965. Execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. Petitioner failed to appear at the appointed time. Consequently, the respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest on February 15, 1965, and an alias warrant on March 23, 1965. Petitioner was never arrested. The Petition: On December 10, 1966, petitioner moved to quash the warrants of arrest, arguing that the penalty had prescribed. The respondent judge denied this motion on December 19, 1966, ruling that the penalty must be served and directing the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. This led to the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue(s)
Whether the prescriptive period for a penalty of imprisonment under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code commences even if the convict was never placed in confinement.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The penalty imposed upon the petitioner has not prescribed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the penalty had not prescribed because the prescriptive period never began to run. Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the prescription of penalties 'shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.' The Court interpreted 'evasion of service of sentence' in accordance with Article 157 of the RPC, which defines the act as escaping during the term of imprisonment by reason of final judgment. The Court noted that the elements of evasion require the offender to be a convict who is already 'serving' a sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty and who then 'escapes' from such service. The terminology used in the law, such as 'jail breaking' and references to 'penal institutions,' necessitates that the convict must have been in actual custody to evade service. In the present case, while Tanega was a convict by final judgment, she was never delivered to a penal institution and never began serving her twenty-day sentence of arresto menor. Because she was never in confinement, she could not have 'escaped' or 'evaded' the service of her sentence within the contemplation of Article 157. Therefore, the one-year prescriptive period for light penalties under Article 92 did not start, and the warrants for her arrest remain valid and enforceable.
Main Doctrine
The period of prescription for a penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence commences to run only from the date the culprit escapes from confinement, not from the date of evasion of service of sentence in general.