Kiener Co. v. Republic
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioners P. J. Kiener Co. Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, as contractors for the Armed Forces of the Philippines on the Mactan Airfield project, claimed P3,601,971.84 for extra work performed. The Secretary of National Defense initially offered to pay only P659,935. To resolve this discrepancy, the parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration under Republic Act No. 876. 2. Procedural History: The arbitrator, after hearing the parties, issued an award on April 21, 1961, granting P2,372,331.40 to the claimants. The claimants then filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on May 19, 1961, for confirmation of this award. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Secretary of National Defense, did not initially file an answer but later moved to intervene and set aside the decision five months after it was rendered, arguing the arbitration was improper without a contractual stipulation and that concurrence from JUSMAG was necessary. The Court of First Instance denied the Republic's motion for intervention and reconsideration on October 1, 1966, leading to the Republic's appeal to the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: The Republic of the Philippines appealed the Court of First Instance's order to the Supreme Court, raising questions of law. The appeal was filed after the reglementary period had expired. The appellees moved to dismiss the appeal due to the Republic's failure to file its printed record on appeal within the prescribed sixty days after notice of the decision. The Solicitor General attributed the delay to excusable negligence. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the appeal on the grounds of inexcusable failure to file the printed record on appeal on time, citing previous jurisprudence on similar procedural lapses.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to confirm the arbitrator's award. Whether the arbitration was proper in the absence of a stipulation in the contract. Whether the concurrence of JUSMAG was necessary for the award to be binding. Whether the Republic of the Philippines has the personality to appeal the order of the Court of First Instance. Whether the appeal should be dismissed due to the failure to file the printed record on appeal within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the failure to file the printed record on appeal within the reglementary period, despite the excuse of excusable negligence, warrants dismissal. The Court found no merit in the Republic's arguments regarding jurisdiction, the propriety of arbitration, and the necessity of JUSMAG concurrence, as these were issues that should have been raised timely and were rendered moot by the procedural failure.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance: The Court affirmed the CFI's jurisdiction to confirm the arbitrator's award under Republic Act No. 876. Section 2 of the Act allows parties to submit to arbitration even without a prior contract to that effect. The Court found that the arguments regarding Sections 607 and 608 of the Revised Administrative Code and the lack of appropriation did not divest the court of its power to confirm the award. Furthermore, the Court noted that by availing of arbitration, the Republic had abandoned the procedure under Commonwealth Act 327, which applies to cases where parties have not agreed to arbitrate. On Due Process: The Court found that due process was satisfied as a copy of the petition for confirmation was served upon the Secretary of National Defense, who had control and supervision over the Armed Forces. This service was in accordance with Section 23 of the Arbitration Act and was deemed sufficient and lawful, especially in the absence of a specific law designating the party to be sued in such construction contracts. On the Issue of Intervention: The Court noted that the motion for intervention was filed after the case had already been disposed of by the CFI. Intervention is generally allowed only at any stage of the trial, which refers to the period for the introduction of evidence. Therefore, the intervention was untimely. On the Appeal and Failure to File Printed Record on Appeal: The Court found that the Republic failed to file its printed record on appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days after notice. The excuse of excusable negligence on the part of a receiving clerk was deemed insufficient and a "habitual subterfuge" for non-compliance with procedural rules. Appellate courts look with disfavor upon such excuses, citing previous cases where similar justifications were rejected. The Court reiterated that the period to file the printed record on appeal had already lapsed when the Republic's motion for intervention was filed, and thus, the motion did not suspend the period. On the Merits of the Republic's Arguments (Implied): Although the appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds, the CFI's resolution addressed the merits, finding that the arbitration was covered by RA 876, that JUSMAG concurrence was not a prerequisite for the CFI's jurisdiction to confirm the award, and that the issue of public funds not being subject to execution was rendered academic by the lifting of the writ of execution. The Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal rendered these substantive issues moot.
Main Doctrine
The failure to file the printed record on appeal within the reglementary period, even with an excuse of excusable negligence, is a ground for dismissal of the appeal, as appellate courts view such excuses with disfavor and consider them habitual subterfuges for non-compliance with procedural requirements.